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1. Introduction  
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the issue of shares to the public from a 
company that was not publicly traded previously i.e. one that is going public for the 
first time. There are a lot of questions associated with the IPO of shares, for 
example why should firms go public, at what time during the life cycle of a 
company should they go public, to whom should they sell the shares etc. Various 
attempts have been made to explain these aspects and a range of theories and 
opinions have become more or less established in contemporary IPO literature. 
Shares can also be sold to a single investor or to a few large investors, 
often called Angels or Venture capitalists. In that case we are not talking about 
IPO and although this is also interesting to elaborate, it is beyond the scope of my 
work and will not be considered here. The main feature is that pre-IPO investors, 
usually no more than a few, do not hold diversified portfolios and IPO allows more 
dispersion of ownership, with advantages and disadvantages. 
A company may go public due to founder's willingness to raise equity 
capital, to diversify their portfolios, to finance a new project when the funds were 
not raised by the founders or received from the banks, to use some of the positive 
actual market conditions etc. 
The main question that I will try to answer is how to evaluate and set the 
price of shares that the company intends to issue. The work will be based on the 
articles of famous economists and my personal opinions, queries and 
conversations with specialists. Deeper research is problematic due to the fact that 
investment bankers are not willing (and not allowed) to provide the data about bids 
and allocations, about long-term relationships between them and potential 
investors, and all other information that could shed some light on their pricing 
decisions.   
By starting with the IPO, it must be stated that every share is difficult and 
costly to evaluate because there are lots of events that may influence the price of 
shares; like systematic and idiosyncratic risks, investor's sentiments, market 
movements etc., and all of these factors have to be put together in order to 
attempt to give a general opinion on what the price of this share could be. Even 
more effort has to be taken to evaluate and determine the price of shares that will 
2 
 
be issued, because there are no past analyst reports to read and no past market 
price to observe.  
       A lot of firms that go public for the first time (especially in the US) are young 
companies and it is very difficult to evaluate their strategic plan, compare them to 
their competitors, make a forecast of their possible future earnings and cash flows, 
find out their industry perspectives and other factors, evaluate their growth 
possibilities and management skills, and the actions which they will and can take. 
Hence, it is a very difficult task, to determine the price of a newly issued 
share with no trading history, that the issuing company and its underwriter are 
faced with. 
Some practitioners say that pricing an IPO is "part art and part science." 
The science is using comparable traded companies to assign a price to the IPO. 
The art is determining the market's interest in the offering.1  
Due to these obvious difficulties, that a company wishing to go public faces, 
it is common that the tasks of determining the price of the shares, and finding and 
attracting potential investors for the company are delegated to an underwriter. An 
underwriter is a specialized firm that determines the offer price of shares and 
conducts the marketing and selling, for which it earns a fee. 
      A company may wish to go public without using an investment banker in 
what has come to be called direct public offering (DPO). This process will not be 
considered here. 
The task of an underwriter, who is normally an Investment banker, is to 
assist the issuing firm in designing and timing security offerings, formulating plans 
for raising funds through the capital markets and organizing the distribution.  One 
fundamental economic function of the investment banker is to underwrite the risk 
of fluctuations in the market price of the securities being issued, during the time of 
the offering.2 
                                                          
1
 Corwin,  Shane  A. , and  P. Schultz, 2005,  The Role  of  IPO  Underwriting  Syndicates:  Pricing, Information   
   Production,  and  Underwriter  Competition,  The  Journal  of  Finance 60, pp 448. 
2
 see Mandelker, G. and A. Raviv, 1977, Investment Banking: An Economic Analysis of  Optimal Underwriting       
   Contracts, The  Journal  of  Finance 32,  pp  683. 
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The main advantages of employing an underwriter, is his reputation capital, 
his skills in evaluating the shares and determining the price, and his good contacts 
with potential investors. But a major advantage of using an Investment banker as 
underwriter is the fact that, while entrepreneurs approach the equity market only 
once, the investment banker interacts repeatedly with the equity market. Not only 
are they more skilled and experienced, they have also a reputation capital which 
they are afraid to lose, which forces them to evaluate honestly and make fair 
estimate of the firms value. Investment banks therefore face a trade-off between 
setting strict standards in evaluating firms, which is costly in the short run but 
beneficial in the long run, and setting low standards which would probably damage 
their reputation but be beneficial in the short run. Stricter evaluation standards 
lower the probability of incorrectly marketing a bad firm as a good one. 
 The objective of an investment bank is to maximize the expected value of 
its future profits. If the present value of future expected profits is bigger than the 
possible earnings from setting a low evaluation standard in the present and 
earning a profit by falsely advertising a bad firm as a good one, no rational 
investment banker will set low standards. 
When a firm decides to go public, it has to consider and evaluate the 
potential benefits and associated costs of going public. There are lots of possible 
benefits that come from publicly traded shares, diversified ownership, venture 
capitalists etc., but there are also some costs of going public, in form of 
underwriter's fees and underpricing of the issue. More about that will be discussed 
in the forthcoming chapters. 
There are also some anomalies related to the IPO of common shares, for 
example the underpricing phenomenon, long run underperformance of IPO shares 
and ''Hot Issue'' market. I will make a significant effort to explain these phenomena 
and give a broader view of existing theories related to these anomalies, which are 
inconsistent with the efficient markets theory that once an IPO stock is publicly 
traded, it is like any other stock, i.e. that the after-market stock price should 
appropriately reflect the stocks' intrinsic value. 
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A significant effort will also be given to explaining the diversification of 
ownership, i.e. at what time to sell the stock, to whom to sell and what are the 
benefits and disadvantages of dispersed and concentrated ownership.   
For example, when stock is publicly traded the additional benefits for 
original stock holders is enhanced liquidity, which allows a company to raise 
capital on more favorable terms and sell shares easily in open-market transactions 
than if it had to compensate investors for the lack of liquidity associated with a 
privately-held company. There are of course the costs that come with these 
benefits, in the form of ongoing costs associated with the need to supply 
information on a regular basis to investors and regulators. Furthermore, there are 
substantial costs associated with IPOs that can be categorized as direct and 
indirect costs. Direct costs include legal, auditing, and underwriting fees. Indirect 
costs are the management time, effort devoted to conducting the offering, and 
underpricing. These direct and indirect costs affect the cost of capital for firms 
going public.3 
Theory predicts that early in its life cycle, a firm will be private, but if it grows 
sufficiently large, it becomes optimal to go public. As long as the firm is private, 
any equity investment is illiquid. As stated before, there are costs that a potential 
investor faces with this lack of liquidity and lack of diversification, for which he will 
have to be compensated. There are also advantages of raising the capital from a 
few investors, as while they will be engaged in monitoring activities and the 
proprietary information will be disclosed to them. According to that, a firm faces a 
simple trade-off, between the benefits and costs of dispersed and concentrated 
ownership. When the cost of concentrated ownership outweighs the benefits, the 
firm will go public, and until then it will be privately owned. 
 All theories of going public and selling the shares to diversified owners 
assume that there are two type of investors, informed and uninformed. Neither the 
wealth of the informed nor that of the uninformed is assumed to be sufficient 
enough to absorb the whole issue4. Therefore, a part of the shares has to be sold 
to informed investors and a part of the shares to uninformed investors. The one 
                                                          
3
 see Ritter, Jay R., 1998, Initial Public Offerings, Contemporary Finance Digest 2. 
4
 Some authors do have different assumptions, as shown in the Chapter 3.1. 
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price rule, which states that the same price charged to informed investors must 
also be charged to uninformed investors implies that the shares must be 
underpriced on average. 
 The existence of different types of investors is a very propitious thing, from 
the both underwriter's and issuer's view-point. Intuition suggests the following: 
Informed investors may have (or are able to produce) the information that may be 
valuable to pricing the issue. Consequently, a key design feature of the IPO 
process is to incentivize informed investors to acquire and reveal this favorable 
information to the underwriter in order to include this information in the process of 
pricing the shares. So the informed investors have to be incentivized to participate 
and to reveal information unknown to others. 
 The second important feature is that uninformed investors must also be 
incentivized to participate. They have to be allocated some minimum amount of 
shares due to the fact that the wealth of informed is assumed not to be large 
enough to absorb the whole issue and the fact that the listing requirements 
generally require a certain percentage of stock that must be widely held, in order 
to achieve a minimum average daily trading volume. It is important to mention here 
that secondary market liquidity increases with the level of ownership dispersion, 
which in turn increases the total information costs and underpricing. 
 Each investor has three alternatives when a firm makes an IPO: ignore the 
IPO, engage in uninformed bidding for shares in the IPO or conduct a costly 
evaluation of the firm, and depending on the outcome, bid (if he gets a good 
evaluation) or not bid (if he gets a bad evaluation) for a share. Among these 
alternatives, each investor chooses the one that maximizes the expected value of 
his time 1 cash flow.5 
 Because of the necessity to attract uninformed investors IPOs have to be 
underpriced on average. Underpricing is a cost known as ' the money left on the 
table'. It is commonly defined as the percentage price change from the offer price 
to the first day's closing price, unless there are some stock exchange restrictions 
in the allowed daily stock price movements (for example 10% of daily volatility 
                                                          
 
5
 see  Chemmanur,  Thomas J.  and  P. Fuglieri,  1999,  A  Theory  of  the  Going-Public Decision,  The Review 
of Financial Studies 12,  pp 258. 
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limit). In that case underpricing will be measured as the price change from the 
offering price to the one week closing price.  
 The focus of this work will be to explain the features of the going public 
decisions, implications and associated effects, with the main emphasis on 
explaining and providing some models for determining the share price and trade-
offs that underwriters are faced to when trying to calculate and set the offer price.   
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2. Theoretical Implications of Initial Public Offerings 
As mentioned already in the Introduction chapter, an IPO firm raises capital 
by selling shares. There are two possible 'sources' from where new shares come 
from; either by issuing new stakes of ownership and so nominally raising the 
ownership capital or by selling the original shareholders' stakes of the firm. The 
firms' objective is to raise desired amount of capital by retaining the largest 
possible amount of ownership in the firm. 
The most important feature and question related with IPO is what are these 
new issued shares actually worth? The intuition should be straightforward; valuing 
IPO shares should not be different from valuing other stocks. The common 
approaches of discounted cash flow analysis and comparable firm analysis can be 
used. Why this is not so easy is that, as many IPOs are of young growth firms and 
high technology industries, historical accounting information is of limited use in 
projecting future profits or cash flows. A preliminary valuation may therefore rely 
on how the market is valuing comparable firms.6 This is also not so reliable, since 
there are lot of factors that can influence a young firm's market performance, 
especially their owner's skills and decisions, which are difficult to evaluate. 
Due to the fact that IPOs are difficult to evaluate, Securities Exchange 
Commission, which has to register and approve United States IPO issues is 
'explicitly concerned with full disclosure of material information, and does not 
attempt to determine whether a security is fairly priced or not'.7  The goal is to 
force a going-public company to supply audited financial statements. That is the 
reason why the most issuers employ underwriters when going public. Beside their 
marketing and selling effort and assistance in pricing, the investment banker 
provides auditing for financial statements. The investment banker will also conduct 
due diligence investigation of the firm, write the prospectus and file the necessary 
documents with the S.E.C. 
The theory has recognized two possible sources of a buyer's valuation of a 
company which the incumbent should seek to capture: increase in cash flow and 
the increase in private benefit of control. When deciding whether to go public or 
                                                          
6
 see Ritter, Jay R., 1998, Initial Public Offerings, Contemporary Finance Digest 2, pp 3. 
7
 see Ritter, Jay R., 1998, Initial Public Offerings, Contemporary Finance Digest 2, pp 1. 
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not and what fraction to sell, the initial owner must balance these two factors8. By 
selling to disperse shareholders, original owners maximize their proceeds from the 
sale of cash flow rights, and by directly bargaining with a potential buyer, a so 
called venture capitalist, they maximize the proceeds from the sale of control 
rights. Cash flow rights are of course enjoyed by all shareholders in proportion to 
the size of their equity stake in the company, and private benefits are captured 
only by the controlling shareholder. The theory behind this intuition is that there 
are two important factors that influence a company's value9; the observed and 
verifiable income produced by the company, and the private benefits of control, an 
observable but non-verifiable component, which only the party that has control 
over the use of corporate resources can enjoy. By issuing shares to outside 
shareholders, the initial owner claims only to give them a fraction of the verifiable 
income that the company will produce in the future. 
This existence of different types of possible investors may give a trade-off 
answering the question at what stage of its life should a firm go public rather than 
undertake its project using private equity financing? If the intuition is that the 
venture capitalist has private information about his firm's value and that outsiders 
can reduce this informational disadvantage by evaluating the firm at a cost, the 
equilibrium timing of the going-public decision is determined by the tradeoff 
between minimizing the duplication in information production by outsiders and 
avoiding the risk-premium demanded by venture capitalists.10 
A firm bears lots of costs when going public, but the most prominent are of 
course underwriting costs, underpricing costs, annual disclosure costs and the 
agency problem costs generated by a separation of ownership and control. The 
most prominent benefits are diversification, greater possibility of equity financing, 
publicity, outside monitoring etc.11 
The next chapter will try to shed light on, and give some theoretical remarks 
on, the underwriting process; a process that a firm going public and employing an 
underwriter will be faced with. 
                                                          
 
8
 see Zinagles, L. ,1995, Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public, Review of Economic Studies 62,             
pp 425. 
 
9
  see Zinagles (1995)  pp 428. 
10
 see Chemmanur, Thomas J. and P. Fuglieri (1999)  pp 249 and pp 256. 
11
 see Zinagles (1995) pp 425. 
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2.1. Underwriting process 
 Underwriting is an important point in explaining the IPO process.  Firms that 
will go public in most of the cases employ an underwriter, which is, as stated 
before, a firm that helps the issuing firm in preparing the IPO process, soliciting the 
indications of interest from potential investors and factor those information into IPO 
process, marketing and selling the issue, setting the price of IPO and giving 
opinions (i.e. analyst coverage) about the stock's aftermarket performance to 
investors once the stock starts publicly trading etc. An underwriter can be viewed 
as a middle man who works between the potential investors and a going public 
company. Mainly the Investment banks play the role of IPO underwriters. 
 An underwriter is assumed to be a company which repeatedly appears in 
the IPO process and an IPO company uses its knowledge, skills, influence, 
business connections and reputation capital to ease its own going public process. 
 Wishing to set IPO share price, Investment banker use accounting 
information (earnings, sales, book value, operating cash flow, different ratios etc.) 
and comparable firms multiplies as benchmark for choosing a preliminary offer 
price range plus collecting the indications of interest, i.e. demand from potential 
investors to get much more accurate pricing.12  
 There is a wealth of literature13 that discusses various valuation methods, 
including: comparable firms' approach (which use market multiples as of a peer 
group), discounted cash-flow approach and asset-based approach, each with their 
advantages and disadvantages. The comparable firm approach works well when 
comparable firms are available, but has no protection against entire sector being 
over- or under-valued. These ratios essentially have only limited use if historical 
numbers rather than forecasts are used. 
The discount cash flow method is, on the other hand, focused on the firm 
itself, but it is very difficult to make an honest estimate of firm's future cash flows 
and appropriate discount rate. The asset based approach, as the third valuation 
method is relevant when a significant portion of the asset can be liquidated quickly 
                                                          
12
 see Moonchul, K., and Jay R. Ritter, 1999, Valuing IPOs, Journal of Financial Economics 53, pp 2. 
13
 see Moonchul, K., and Jay R. Ritter (1999) pp 3. 
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at market prices. But for most IPOs, this approach has little evidence since most of 
stock value comes from growth opportunities rather than assets in place. 
Within an industry, the variation in these ratios can be large, so they have 
only modest predictive value. Many idiosyncratic factors are not captured by 
industry multiples unless various adjustments for differences in growth and 
profitability are made. With the use of earnings forecasts, the valuation accuracy 
improves substantially. It is worth mentioning that the valuation accuracy is higher 
for older firms than for young firms. It is obvious that older firms have more data to 
use than young firms, which makes the estimate more accurate. The difficulty with 
using comparable firm multiples for valuing IPOs, without further adjustments, 
leaves a large role for investment bankers in valuing IPOs.14 Namely investment 
bankers are able to achieve additional valuation accuracy by canvassing market 
demand before setting a final offer price and to set the final offer price conditional 
on the market feedback they receive from potential investors. 
Moonchul and Ritter [33] argue, that although 'much attention has been 
focused on the wide variation between the offer price and subsequent market 
prices that occur in practice, the pricing precision would be much worse if a 
mechanical algorithm was used instead.'15 
 The common way on which underwriters base their pricing decision is by 
first starting with an analysis of the market price ratios, adjusting for firm-specific 
differences, and then trying to determine a minimum and maximum offer price. 
After that, they gather more information about the IPO market by collecting the 
indications of interest from potential investors and depending on their expectations 
set a final offer price.16 
 Marketing and analyzing of IPO companies by reliable underwriters is also 
in the interest of potential investors, because the expected allocation an investor 
can expect may be too small to compensate him for the costs of analyzing the 
                                                          
 
14
  see Moonchul, K., and Jay R. Ritter (1999) pp 19. 
 
15
  see Moonchul, K., and Jay R. Ritter (1999) pp 19. 
 
16
  see Moonchul, K., and Jay R. Ritter (1999) pp 7. 
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offering. Hence, potential investors will have to rely on the underwriter's 
information.17   
Another reason to employ an Investment banker is his distribution and 
marketing effort. An investment banker, due to his business connections and skills, 
can generate demand for the issue. He can persuade customers to purchase, or 
he can certify the issue by putting his reputation behind it as well.18 A major 
advantage of the investment banker, beside already mentioned, is his reputation. 
An investment bank is namely an established institution with a lot of IPOs behind it 
and many to come as well. It is not willing to misrepresent the value of the issue to 
the potential investors because by doing so it would damage its own reputation, be 
pushed away from the market and lose its entire market place. The potential 
investors will be much more confident in the investment banker's value estimation 
than in the company's own estimation. The IPO Company itself cannot offer 
credible assurance that the offering price is not to high, i.e. below the expected 
market price. While entering the IPO market by definition only once, IPO firms 
therefore have much more incentive to misrepresent their own value and try to 
earn, cheating the investors by falsely representing themselves as a higher quality 
than they actually are. 
 The Underwriters' reputation is not only valuable for its credibility and 
trustworthiness, but also for the fact that the underwriter can reduce the costs of 
going public by allocating the IPO shares to regular investors and forcing them to 
participate in every issue even when they might not be willing, but are forced to do 
so because of the threat of reducing allocation priority in future if rejecting 
participation in every issue. The trade-off is that the expected value of future 
profits should exceed the possible losses incurred through participation in current 
issue. This way, investors' expected revenue can be reduced, in the favor of the 
issuer.  
An underwriter faces a difficult task, namely, if on average it does not 
underprice its offerings enough, the average initial return will be too low and 
                                                          
 
17
 see Tiniç, Seha  M., 1988,  Anatomy  of  Initial  Public  Offerings  of  Common  Stock,  The Journal of 
Finance 43, pp 798. 
 
18
 see  Baron,   David P.,  1982,   A  Model  of  the   Demand   for   Investment   Banking   Advising  and 
Distribution  Services  for  New  Issues,  The  Journal  of  Finance 37,  pp  956. 
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investors will stop doing business with this underwriter. On the other hand, if it 
underprices its offerings too much, so that the average initial return is too high, 
potential issuers will cease using this underwriter.19 
 An important feature, to be further discussed in forthcoming chapters, is that 
not only the issuing company, but sometimes also potential investors are willing to 
misrepresent their valuation and findings, in order to benefit from falsely reporting 
their own estimates. The basic difficulty that an underwriter, wishing to collect 
information useful to pricing an issue, faces is therefore to force investors with 
information that can be useful in pricing the issue to report truthfully.20 
The focus of many IPO articles was to find out whether the issuer is more 
informed than the investor, or the opposite. If the issuer is better informed, rational 
investors would fear a lemon's problem. On the other hand if investors are more 
informed than the issuer then the issuer faces a placement problem, because he 
does not know the price the market is willing to bear and hence faces an unknown 
demand for its stock. In both cases, the observed (successful) IPOs necessarily 
have to be underpriced.21 Most theories imply that firms with greater uncertainty 
about their share value will be underpriced more and firms wishing to issue shares 
have incentives to reduce the amount of uncertainty that possible investors are 
faced with.22 
The common view on potential IPO investors accepts the fact that investors 
are not equally informed. Some are better informed, i.e. have preferential 
information and are informed even better than the underwriter (about the IPO firm, 
its competitors and market conditions for example), and others are less informed, 
the so called uninformed.  If for example all investors were equally informed, then 
only underpriced shares could start trading because nobody would buy overpriced 
issues. There are, however, some overpriced firms that do go public, which would 
                                                          
 
19
 see   Beatty,   Randolph  P.   and  Jay  R.  Ritter,   1986,    Investment  banking,  reputation  and   the  
underpricing of initial public offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 15, pp 217. 
 
20
 see  Benveniste,  L. and P.A. Spindt, 1989,  How Investment Bankers  Determine the Offer Price and 
Allocation of New Issues,  Journal of Financial Economics 24, pp 344. 
 
21
 see  Ritter,  Jay R. and I. Welch, 2002,  A Review of IPO Activity,  Pricing, and Allocations,  Journal of 
Finance 57, pp 1803. 
 
22
  This will be explained in more detail in the next Chapter. 
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not be predicted because all investors are assumed to know that these would be 
overpriced.23  
These informed investors are for sure not willing to reveal their positive 
information before the stock is on the market, because 'by keeping such 
information to themselves until after the offering investors can benefit; they would 
pay a low initial price for the stock and then could sell it at the full information price 
in the post offering market.'24 
 The important part of Investment banker's work is to overcome these 
incentives, i.e. to induce informed investors to reveal their information. This can 
only be done if the investors with preferential information will be better-off 
revealing their information than retaining it for themselves.25   
 After soliciting interest and making an estimate of offer price range, 
investment bankers promote the issue and induce an adequate number26 of 
investors to investigate the issue and produce private estimates of value. After 
that, 'conditional on issuer's desired ownership dispersion and secondary market 
liquidity, investment bankers set a final offering price based on the estimates of 
total information costs and expected demand for shares.'27 
Nobody knows what the market performance of the stock will be when 
trading starts. If the demand is weak, investment bankers may try to stabilize the 
price by somehow reducing selling pressure. This type of market manipulation is 
the only one that Securities Exchange Commission allows. These price 
stabilization activities include pre-IPO allocation policy, post-IPO purchases of 
shares by the lead underwriter, and the discouragement of selling.28 
Hence, the underwriter services are very important for an IPO company 
wishing to make its going public process reliable and attractive to potential 
investors.  
                                                          
 23 see Ritter,  Jay R. and I. Welch, 2002, A Review of IPO Activity,  Pricing, and Allocations,  Journal of     
Finance 57, pp 1804. 
 
24
  see Benveniste, L. and P.A. Spindt ( 1989) pp 344. 
 
25
  For more about this part of IPO process see Chapter 3.1. 
 
26
  More about the adequate number of informed investors is going to be stated in the Chapter 3.4. 
 
27
 see  Booth, J. and  L. Chua, 1996,  Ownership  dispersion,  costly information  and IPO underpricing  
Journal of Financial Economics 41, pp 292. 
 
28
  see Ritter, Jay R. and I. Welch, (2002) pp 1804. 
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In the next chapter one of the most controversial facts related to IPO of 
shares will be described and tried to explain, namely the underpricing of IPOs.  
 
2.2. Underpricing phenomenon 
 Underpricing is one of the costs that may29 occur when a firm goes public.  
This is not literally a cost that the firm issuing shares has to pay; it is more the cost 
in the sense of foregone profits. For example, the shares are issued and at the 
end of the first trading day the price is 20% above the issuing price. Assuming that 
the shares actually could have been sold at this price, i.e. that the demand for 
shares is inelastic (whether or not this assumption holds is another important issue 
not considered here), the cost is then the multiple of number of shares issued 
times the change from offer price to first day closing price. Underpricing is 
therefore the cost and the amount of this cost is often referred as the 'money left 
on the table'.30  
 This definition prevails, although some researchers argue with it. For 
example, Baron [3] shows that the underpricing is not simply the amount of money 
left on the table. He states that underpricing entails a wealth transfer from original 
shareholders to the new shareholders. The gains of these new purchasers must 
be equal to losses of original shareholders. From this wealth perspective, he 
states that the proper percentage measure of underpricing from the issuer's point 
of view depends on the extent to which "old" shareholders participate in the 
offering by selling their own shares. This is closely explained in the following 
sentence. If prior owners issue small IPOs in relation to their own shares, they will 
be less concerned with underpricing. They will be more concerned with 
underpricing as the size of the issue grows (relative to their own holdings) or as 
they participate further by offering more of their own shares. Thus, from the 
                                                          
 
29
 Some theories imply that underpricing has to occur in every single offering as it is actually a sort of 
repayment for the costs that informed investors have to bear when scrutinizing the firm. Nevertheless, 
there are some issues that turn out to be overpriced.  
 
30
 see Ljungqvist, A.,  IPO Underpricing,  2004,  Handbooks  in Finance:  Empirical  Corporate  Finance, 
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issuer's viewpoint, underpricing is especially costly in large issues in which a high 
fraction of the previously outstanding shares is offered.31  
There are many explanations (attempts of explanations) as to why 
underpricing occurs and probably all of them contain some element of truth. The 
underpricing phenomenon has persisted for decades with no signs of imminent 
demise.32 
 The most important theories about underpricing will be explained in this 
chapter. They are mainly based on uncertainty about the fair stock price, on the 
existence of different type of investors (uninformed and informed), on the 
necessity to underprice in order to encourage informed investors to reveal their 
positive information about the firm etc. 
 Benveniste and Spindt [6] argue that underpricing arises to provide 
incentives for regular investors to reveal good information and Rock [36] argues 
that underpricing is necessary to prevent the uninformed investors from leaving 
the IPO market. This explanation is controversial while some research33 
demonstrates the huge oversubscription of the issues; issues which could then 
easily be exhausted by informed demand. The question of what should, in that 
case, be the benefits of participation of uninformed investors remains unanswered. 
With oversubscription, rationing34 has to occur. The IPOs may be so significantly 
oversubscribed because investors may be overstating their true interest in order to 
be allocated only their expected and desired amount of shares. 
 Booth and Chua [10] argue that the demand for ownership dispersion 
creates an incentive to underprice, because underpricing promotes 
oversubscription, which in turn increases secondary market liquidity and reduces 
the required return to the investor. I will now emphasize some of the most common 
accepted explanations of underpricing. 
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 see Barry, Christopher B., 1989, Initial Public Offering Underpricing: The Issuer's View-A Comment,  The 
Journal of Finance 44,  pp 1101. 
 
32
  see Ritter, Jay R., 1998, Initial Public Offerings, Contemporary Finance Digest 2, pp 10. 
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 see Koh, F., and T. Walter, 1989, A Direct Test of Rock's Model of the Pricing of Unseasoned Issues, 
Journal of Financial Economics 23 
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  More about rationing in the Chapter 4.3. 
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 2.2.1. Winner's Curse 
 Winner's curse is one of the possible explanations of underpricing. It is the 
best known asymmetric information model, introduced in 1986 by Rock [36]. Rock 
observes some investors as being asymmetrically informed about the prospectus 
of an IPO, of the firm and its perspectives or about the market where the firm 
operates. Rock states that underpricing could arise from that fact. His work is an 
application of the famous lemon's problem. Rock thus assumes two different types 
of investors; informed and uninformed, with no group having enough funds to 
participate in the IPO alone, i.e. members of both groups have to participate in the 
offer. Uninformed investors bid in every offer, and informed investors bid only if 
their valuation or their expected market value of the share is bigger than the offer 
price. Assuming that the issuer would allocate the shares in the sense that every 
offer has an equal chance of being filled, uninformed investors would face so 
called winner's curse- they will receive their full allocation of the overpriced issues 
but only a small allocation of underpriced issues. If they get all of the shares which 
they ask for, it will be because the informed investors did not want the shares. 
That occurs due to the fact that relatively fixed number of shares are sold at IPO, 
and if demand is very strong, i.e. number of shares desired is bigger than number 
of shares offered, then rationing will occur. Rationing itself does not lead to 
underpricing, but if some investors are at an informational disadvantage relative to 
others, they will be worse off. If some investors are more likely to attempt to buy 
shares when an issue is underpriced, then the amount of excess demand will be 
higher when there is more underpricing.  
The average return that uninformed investors earn conditional upon 
receiving shares is therefore lower than the average initial return conditional upon 
submitting a purchase order.35 This is so called „winner´s curse“ problem: if one is 
allocated the requested number of shares, one can expect that the initial return will 
                                                          
35
 The  difference  between these two conditional  expected returns becomes larger as the dispersion of   
possible  firm values  increases.  Thus,  the uninformed  investors will be willing to submit purchase  
orders  for more speculative  IPOs  only  if the  expected underpricing  is greater  than for issues for 
which  there is less ex ante uncertainty about the true firm value.  See Ritter, Jay R., 1987, The costs of  
going public, Journal of Financial Economics 19, pp276. 
17 
 
be less than average.36 Namely, if the IPOs were priced on average at their fair 
value, i.e. with no discount, retail investors would lose money while allocating a 
disproportionately small fraction of underpriced offers and a disproportionately 
large fraction of overpriced offers, and they would withdraw from the market.37 
Their demand would not be available any more. Thus, they must be somehow 
incentivized to participate, and one form of incentives could be to systematically 
underprice every IPO to offset this winner's curse problem. Thus, to eliminate the 
winner's curse problem, the expected profit of uninformed investors must be non-
negative.  
Even though IPOs are on average underpriced, no investor can be sure 
what an offering's value once it starts publicly trading will be. Beatty and Ritter [4] 
call this uncertainty ex ante uncertainty, and argue that the greater this ex ante 
uncertainty is, the greater will the winner's curse be, and hence the greater 
expected underpricing will be as well.   
This is the main feature of underpricing theories based on asymmetric 
information38. They predict that the underpricing is positively related to the degree 
of asymmetric information. When this asymmetric information uncertainty 
approaches zero in these models, underpricing disappears entirely. This statement 
makes an incentive for the issuers to voluntarily disclose the information that can 
be beneficial in reducing the information heterogeneity between informed and 
uninformed investors.39 
 Therefore, winner's curse could be easily avoided. Above that, as Welch 
[48] concludes, winner's curse could also be avoided either by offering IPOs only 
in pools or by agreeing to withdraw an issue or to compensate in some other way 
the uninformed investors if demand from informed is not forthcoming.40 
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 As winner's curse explanation of underpricing is based on information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors, a logical conclusion 
would be that reducing this asymmetry reduces the underpricing. 
 
2.2.2. Insurance hypothesis of underpricing  
Another possible explanation of underpricing, outlined by Tiniç [47] is the 
Insurance hypothesis of underpricing. It is related to the insurance against legal 
liabilities and associated damages to investors. 
This hypothesis is specially related to the US41, where the Securities 
Exchange Commission imposed a 'positive obligation for every professional 
involved in the offering to diligently examine, inquire, and ensure that every 
material fact relating to the operations and affairs of the issuer that may affect a 
potential investor is properly examined and disclosed'42. If they do not properly 
examine and disclose all related and important information, the Securities Act of 
1933 makes them (all participants in the offer who sign the prospectus) liable for 
material omissions.43 
While 'due-diligence' investigations are 'fraught with difficulties and 
uncertainties'44, the expected costs of legal liabilities are particularly high for IPOs. 
Issuers and investment bankers are subject to legal liabilities and may try to 
protect themselves by underpricing the issue. Underpricing can be then viewed as 
implicit insurance against potential liabilities that may arise from the 'due-diligence' 
and disclosure requirements of the regulation authorities, while Securities Act 
limits the maximum recoverable damage to the offer price.45 Large initial returns 
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 Underpricing is a global phenomenon and liabilities are not. 
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 see Tiniç, Seha M.,1988, Anatomy of  Initial Public  Offerings of Common Stock, The Journal of Finance 
43, pp 798. 
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 see Ritter, Jay R., 1998, Initial Public Offerings, Contemporary Finance Digest 2, pp 9. 
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 see Tiniç,Seha M., 1988, Anatomy of  Initial Public  Offerings of Common Stock, The Journal of Finance 
43, pp 799. 
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will namely 'reduce the probability of a lawsuit and the conditional probability of an 
adverse judgment'.46 
 These large initial returns are induced by indicating many risk factors in the 
prospectus and thus shifting the risk to investors. This way, the probability of 
'material omission' is curtailed, and underpricing is induced while more risk factors 
induce uncertainty about stock's performance, which results in increased 
underpricing. 
 
2.2.3. Cascades 
 A cascade is another explanation of underpricing, outlined by Welch [50]. 
Cascades, in some cases also called 'bandwagon effects',47 occur when 
underwriters market IPOs aggressively through the road shows.48 If an investment 
banker markets the issue aggressively, the situation where investors pay no more 
attention only to their own evaluations and expectations but to the other investors' 
interest as well can occur. If it happens that some influential investors buy IPO 
shares and assess the issue as attractive, other investors could start buying 
shares irrespective of their own original valuation, which they will disregard. This 
could lead to excess demand for shares, which would be reflected in the high offer 
price. 
 Issuers could prefer to strategically underprice in order to encourage early 
demand and induce some informed and reputable investors to buy initially, and so 
to induce other investors to follow. 
The flip side may occur as well; if an investor notices that other investors 
are not buying the shares, he can underestimate his own, maybe positive, 
information about the firms' value, and refuse to buy the shares irrespective of his 
own information. 
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 An interesting implication is that, in bandwagon cases, positively-sloped 
demand curve can occur.49 If the offering price is adjusted upwards, investors 
know that it will be only partial adjusted50 and will infer that these offerings are 
going to be underpriced. Accordingly, they'll try to purchase more shares, which 
will result in a positively sloped demand curve. 
 Early investors, knowing the benefits the issuer and investment banker will 
have if they purchase early, can demand greater underpricing in return for their 
early offer and thus start a positive cascade.51 
 
2.2.4. Market feedback hypothesis 
 The market feedback hypothesis as the attempt to explain underpricing is 
based on the fact that, when pricing the IPO shares, an investment banker has to 
canvass the market demand and include a potential investor's indication of interest 
and their privileged information in the share pricing process. But the question of 
how to induce informed investors to reveal their preferred information to the 
investment banker arises. The investment banker can compensate them via 
underpricing the shares. This is what the market feedback hypothesis states. What 
would be the benefits of such behavior for the investment banker and the issuer? 
Well, including the positive information into the pricing process will lead to a higher 
offer price, but this offer price will only be partially adjusted- so the issuer will 
benefit and the informed investor will benefit as well. Those IPOs with the price 
adjusted upwards will therefore be more underpriced than those with a downward 
adjustment of price. 
An informed investor will be promised to receive a bigger allocation52 in the 
shares than he would receive if not revealing the positive information. This way he 
will be also better-off when revealing positive information about share value. 
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 When there are many informed investors, underpricing arises when they 
reveal their information, but that in turn increases the ownership dispersion, which 
increases liquidity and consequently the share price. 
 The market feedback theory implies that informed investors are rewarded 
for their preferential information. In a competitive market, investors will choose to 
become informed as long as the costs of becoming informed are lower than the 
benefits of becoming informed and to reveal the results of their information 
gathering process to the investment banker. In equilibrium, as more and more 
investors enter the market, the costs of becoming informed have to be equal to the 
benefits of receiving underpriced shares and the costs of becoming informed are 
actually borne by the firm due to necessity of underpricing. An outsider's expected 
payoff from producing information, net of information acquisition costs, is zero.53 In 
that sense, a fact that the firm obtains a significant part of its financing from 
uninformed investors means that the cost of capital will be reduced.54Beatty and 
Ritter55 [4] model an optimal IPO offer price based on these costs of becoming 
informed.  
One could argue, that if the issuer has to bear all incurred costs of all 
investors who desire to become informed, then why not to sell shares to a single 
investor, venture capitalists. This logic holds, but we have to consider the flip side 
as well; if all shares are bought by a single investor, he will be less diversified and 
hence desire a risk premium, plus he will have 'considerably more bargaining 
power relative to the entrepreneur compared to the numerous small investors 
whose financing the firm can tap in the public equity market'.56 
In equilibrium, a firm should be indifferent to selling to venture capitalists or 
to numerous outside investors. The theory predicts that a young firm, where 
evaluation costs would be large, is better-off when selling to venture capitalists. 
And as the firm ages, establishes a business and becomes publicly 'known', it's 
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evaluation costs sink and the firm will be better-off selling to numerous outside 
investors. The logic is straightforward; these smaller magnitudes of the evaluation 
cost and the ability to tap numerous small investors by going public will outweigh 
the disadvantage of the duplication in evaluation costs which occurs in the public 
equity market.57 
 
2.3. Type of underwriting contracts 
 After explaining the possible sources of underpricing and actions the 
underwriter can take in order to closely determine IPO share price, I will start to 
explain the actions which the issuer and investment banker can undertake and 
different contracts they can sign, in order to put their goals in line. 
 There are two main ways- or contracts- how an issuer and underwriter can 
regulate their business. One is firm commitment contract and the other is best 
effort contract.  
The investment bank, having signed a firm-commitment contract with the 
issuer, usually conducts the marketing campaign and solicits interest from 
potential investors. At the end of this period, the investment banker and issuer 
construct a demand curve and, depending on the position of it, set the final offer 
price. In the best-effort offering, the investment bank is not soliciting the indications 
of interest. Firm commitment offerings are hence typically sold using 
bookbuilding58 and best effort offerings are conducted via fixed price offerings.59  
 The main difference, despite above mentioned dissimilarities, is that under 
the firm commitment contract, the underwriter commits to purchasing new issued 
stock from the firm and then trying to sell them to the public, while with best effort 
contract arranged, the underwriter commits only to making his best effort in selling 
the some prespecified minimum and maximum number of shares. So, in the best 
effort offer the issuing firm bears the proceeds risk, whereas in a firm commitment 
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offer this risk is borne by the investment banker. More about firm-commitment and 
best-effort offerings will be told in the next chapters.  
 
2.3.1. Firm commitment contract 
As mentioned already, under a firm commitment contract an investment 
banker manages and markets the issue, sets together with the issuer a tentative 
number of shares to be sold and tentative offer price60, tries to solicit the investors' 
interest and depending on received indications together with the issuer sets the 
offer price. After the completion of these steps, the investment banker is obliged to 
buy the whole issue from the issuer. But the investment banker will certainly not 
hold the whole issue for himself; he will rather try to sell the shares on the market. 
Regardless of over- and under-subscription and of the proceeds of the issue, the 
issuing firm will receive all the fixed proceeds that the investment banker has 
guaranteed. 
Clearly, in firm commitment offering, the investment banker puts his own 
capital at risk by committing to buy the securities from the issuer. Investment 
banker consequently needs reliable information to avoid overpricing this shares 
and losing money on the offering.61 
 While the Investment banker has to purchase all shares not presold at the 
offer price, he has the incentive to sell the entire issue in the premarket. But, if the 
investors demand is not forthcoming, he has to induce them to buy shares, and he 
will be doing this by underpricing the shares.62  
 If the other extreme occurs, i.e. if the demand exceeds supply, the rationing 
will occur, and/or the so called 'overallotment option', i.e. Green shoe option, if 
settled, will be exercised. This option permits the investment banker to sell as 
many as 15%63 more shares.64  
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 This underwriters ability to exercise the option for oversubscribed (i.e. 
underpriced) offers helps to ameliorate the adverse selection facing uninformed 
investors;65 if there are more shares, uninformed investors will be less rationed 
and consequently be less frightened of winner's curse problem. Hence, their 
desired underpricing will be smaller. Similarly, the informed Investors' desired 
underpricing will also be smaller, while when there are more shares to be allocated 
to them, then they can receive the same profit with less underpricing per share. 
Thus, the Over Allotment option reduces the underpricing. 
 If the investment bankers expect the aftermarket demand to be high, they 
will exercise the Over Allotment option. And how would they act if they expect the 
aftermarket demand being weak? In this situation, they may 'presell66 135% of the 
offering with the shares above the Over Allotment option representing a naked 
short position in the stock. If they expect shares to be 'flipped', i.e. sold 
immediately in the aftermarket, they can buy them back and retire the shares just 
as if they had never been issued'.67 This way they can manipulate the share's 
price, alleviate the price drop, and earn on a price difference. 
 An underwriter's incentive is to presell the whole issue, and that promotes 
underpricing. The stronger ex ante price uncertainty about the offering, the 
stronger is the underwriters' incentive to presell the issue.68 To remove this 
underwriter's incentive to presell, and consequently reduce the underpricing, a firm 
facing high price uncertainty may select a best-effort underwriting contract, under 
which the proceeds are more uncertain69, as will be shown in the next chapter.  
This situation leads to a trade-off; firms facing more price uncertainty, 
whose IPOs will consequently have to be most severely underpriced are 'more  
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likely to choose best-effort contracts, whereas those whose owners are 
most risk-averse are more likely to choose firm-commitment contracts.'70 
Firm commitment offer is an offer without any selling requirements, but they 
are not simply best effort offerings with zero sales requirements;71 here the 
underwriter commits to accept any unsold shares, what is not the case in the best-
effort offerings. 
 If the underwriter will not guarantee a sufficiently high price that the issuer is 
happy with, the firm-commitment offering will be thus converted to best-effort 
offering if the firm desires to take its chance on the market rather than accept 
lower investment's banker price proposal.  
 The total net proceeds the issuer gets are lower than the multiple of shares 
issued and the offering price- since the investment banker may not sell the shares 
for a bigger price than the offering price, and since he must also earn something, 
the actual amount that the issuing firm receives is issuing proceeds minus the 
investment banker fees.72 
 
2.3.2. Best effort contract 
 The Best effort contract is the second possible contract that IPO firm can 
underwrite with its investment banker. The main difference from the firm-
commitment offering is that, under the best effort contract, the investment banker 
is only employed for distribution and does not underwrite the issue. The 
investment banker is simply employed to provide its best efforts to obtain 
purchasers for the newly issued securities. It does not commit to buy the whole 
issue from the issuer and therefore, the whole risk is born by the issuing firm.73  
 As argued in the previous chapter, firms with higher ex ante uncertainty 
about its share value will most likely prefer to use a best effort contract than the 
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firms with low ex ante uncertainty about their share value.74 The logic is 
straightforward; with firm-commitment offering, as ex ante uncertainty increases, 
more and more money has to be left on the table to compensate uninformed 
investors for the winner's curse problem they face and consequently increasing the 
dilution of the original owner's stakes. At some point, as this dilution increases, the 
issuing firm finds it will be better-off switching to a best efforts offering. In this 
offering the adverse selection problem is avoided and less underpricing is 
required. The firm trades-off this dilution facing the original shareholders with the 
probability of subscription. Namely, with best-effort offerings some projects will be 
foregone if the best-effort offering (due to its minimum sales constraint) are 
withdrawn.  Only if dilution from using a firm commitment contract would be 
sufficiently great, then it is optimal to forego this positive net present value 
projects.75 
 With a best effort contract, issuing firm and its investment banker agree on 
the offer price76 and on the minimum and maximum number of shares for selling.77 
Then a selling period commences, during which the investment banker makes its 
best effort to sell the shares. If the minimum number of shares is not sold at the 
offer price within a specified period, the offer is withdrawn, investor's monies are 
refunded and issuing firm receives no money. 
This feature of imposing a minimum number of shares that have to be sold, 
so called "Minimum Sales Constraint," is often settled in the best-effort contract. It 
reduces the underpricing by alleviating the winner's curse on uninformed investors, 
but increases the probability of withdrawing the offer if the informed demand is not 
forthcoming.  
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 High minimum sales constraint and high over allotment option protect 
uninformed investors against the winner's curse, by hence eliminating offerings 
with poor demand or by adding shares when demand is high.78 This commitment 
to reduce the underpricing due to minimum sales constraint is more valuable when 
the required underpricing without minimum sales constraint would be too high.79 
 In that sense, a best-effort contract with minimum sales constraint can be 
viewed as a firm commitment contract, in which the investment banker gives the 
uninformed investors the right to sell the shares back to the firm at the offering 
price if the informed demand is not forthcoming.  Informed demand is only 
forthcoming when the offering is underpriced, which actually means that the 
uninformed investors have this put option always when the market price of share is 
smaller than the offer price.80  If there are no costs of submitting a purchase order 
and exercising this put option, uninformed investors will submit purchase orders as 
long as there is some positive probability that market value of share will exceed 
the offer price. Since the offering is withdrawn if informed demand is not 
forthcoming, issuing firm faces a trade-off between the offering price and the 
probability that the offering will be subscribed.81  
  
2.4. Hot Issue Market  
 One of interesting features of Initial public offerings is so called 'Hot issue 
Market' phenomenon. Hot issue Market is 'a short interval of time, characterized 
by high IPO volume, when disproportionately large number of firms from a 
particular industry goes public'82 and high levels of initial returns.83  
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Rational explanations for the existence of hot issue markets are difficult84 to 
find (some authors85 also state that corporate finance theory does not have at all 
any good explanations for these patterns) but there are some explanation 
attempts.  One possible explanation of the hot issue markets could be that when 
the level of stock prices is high, the private benefits consequently are less 
important and more companies will want to go public. This implies that the 'IPO 
activity should rise following an increase in stock prices. The flip side may occur as 
well; when the stock prices are low then the average value of cash flow rights is 
low and the private benefits of control are then relatively more important. 86 
This explanation is based on the conjecture that the level of demand is 
extremely variable and related to the market conditions that prevail at the time of 
the offering.87 Derrien [19] states that 'in bullish situations the huge uninformed 
demand for the shares, submitted mostly at market prices is very likely to influence 
the outcome of the offering and the aftermarket IPO share performance'.88 
Another possible explanation of the 'hot issue market' phenomenon is that, 
when one firm goes public, investors inquire not only its particularities, but also 
market conditions, industry perspectives etc. When another firm from the same 
industry chooses to go public, the evaluation costs that the investors, wishing to 
scrutinize this firm, will have to borne are therefore smaller and consequently the 
underpricing will be smaller as well. Hence, when one firm from a specific industry 
desires to go public, others will go public as well, i.e. underwriters bundle the IPOs 
across industries.89  
With this conjecture, the underpricing should therefore be smaller when the 
IPO volume raises; the first firm from a specific industry going public will offer 
higher initial return, which will be followed by rising IPO volume (other firms from 
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the same industry will go public)  and consequently decreasing initial returns will 
be observed.  The question how to induce one firm from a specific industry to be 
the first one to go public, when it could benefit if waiting for one of its competitors 
go public first, remains.  
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3. Different efforts on determining IPO share price 
After explaining theoretical implications of IPO's and laying stress on 
different IPO phenomena and irregularities, in the forthcoming chapters significant 
effort will be given in pointing out different efforts that have tried to explain, 
establish and calculate the optimal IPO share price. As already mentioned, IPO 
process is very stressed and difficult while lot of factors and possible outcomes 
have to be viewed and incorporated in the pricing process. IPO pricing process is 
not a simple mechanical algorithm90, it is rather a sum of different methods, efforts, 
market conditions, goals and skills that the investment banker has to put together 
and, based on his broad knowledge and experience aligned with issuer goals, 
determine the offer price.  
Although the IPO process is not a simple algorithm, there is however 
regularities and models that an underwriter has to observe and implement in the 
IPO pricing process in order to set the offer price range more precisely.    
 
3.1. Information Extraction Model 
Information Extraction Model was introduced by Benveniste and Spindt [6] 
in 1989. A part of their work, related to this model, was already mentioned.91 In this 
Chapter their work will be presented in more detail.  
The Work of Benveniste and Spindt is based on asymmetrically informed 
investors, i.e. informed investors and uninformed investors. As stated already, 
informed investors are assumed to have some preferential information about the 
issuing company. This preferential information the investment banker has to solicit 
and factor these findings as much as possible into the IPO pricing process.  
A firm may have informational advantage relative to the outsiders about firm 
specific, i.e. idiosyncratic, risks and opportunities and the outsiders may be more 
informed about systematic factors. But neither these informed investors nor the 
issuing firm itself can know precisely what the aftermarket's stock performance will 
be. Incorporating outsider's information in the pricing process may help to 
determine the fair price more precisely. The basic difficulty that an underwriter 
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faces in this process of collecting useful outsider's information is that outsiders 
have no incentive to reveal this positive information. They are more willing to keep 
such information for themselves until the firm goes public and consequently buy 
the underpriced shares which they will sell after the positive information has been 
revealed.  
Benveniste and Spindt argue that this incentive has to be overcome. They 
model a rule relating to the offer price and share allocation to investor's indications 
of interest that will induce informed investors to reveal the preferential information. 
This process has a consequence that some money is left on the table by the 
issuer. Important feature of the model is the discretionary allocation rule, which 
underwriters have to have. Only with this threat that an informed investor, if not 
reporting truthfully, will be excluded from the allocation process, underwriter can 
induce informed investors to reveal their information. Truth-telling investor will 
consequently be rewarded with some proportion of money that has been left on 
the table. The ability to sell to uninformed investors as well is valuable for 
underwriter in the sense that informed investors do not need to be over-
compensated.92 With this threat of giving some allocation to uninformed investors, 
informed investors will be forced to give more honest and accurate feedback 
consequently receiving the higher allocation and in the same time increasing the 
offer price.  Benveniste and Spindt are especially interested in this part of inducing 
information revelation, establishing the offer price and allocation rules.93 
Before collecting the information from informed investors, underwriter first 
conducts its own analysis of the issuer94 and then creates so called 'road show'; a 
process of informing and educating potential investors and in the same time 
soliciting their indications of interest and preferential information about the issue. 
This term, 'indication of interest', authors define as nonbinding orders at the 
different prices that underwriter solicits from informed investors during the 
premarket process. These nonbinding orders are then used in setting the final 
offer price and in the process of determining the allocation of shares.   
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Benveniste and Spindt express a simple model. In this model regular 
investors in the premarket choose simple indications of interest, in form of either g 
(good) or  b (bad) which consequently determines their allocation and the offer 
price that the issuer will set. Price and allocation hence depend jointly on investor's 
indication and declarations of other investors. 
Only the flexibility of the book-building allocation mechanism95 allows the 
preferred information to be extracted. As stated before, the cost that the issuers 
have to pay in order to be able to extract this information is underpricing.  
Underwriters are willing to voluntarily underprice the issues because by 
doing that, they can get more precise view about stock's value and set a price 
more accurately. The offer price would be much smaller if no information was 
raised and the uncertainty about stock market performance remained high.  
Consequently, informed investors are more willing to reveal their 
preferential information and thus receive a bigger allocation of higher-priced 
shares, then to cheat and indicate a low quality trying to earn on misrepresenting 
their information. This behavior could jeopardize their expected allocation if the 
underwriter finds out that the investor has cheated.    
The more favorable information are revealed the higher will the offer price 
be. On the other hand, underpricing will be higher as well. The reason for this 
higher underpricing is the fact that the offer price will be only partially adjusted96 
because the informed investors who revealed their information have to be 
rewarded. 
Basic Benveniste and Spindt model consists of a private firm offering a fixed 
fraction of its future cash flows (Shares) for sale, and a population of investors. 
The future cash flow for sale is summarized as a random variable , about which 
mean value both, the firm making an offer and investors in the model, have some 
information. The firm consequently decides to sell off  in  shares. The price of 
the offering should be the expected present value of . 
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To capture in the model some real world facts, Benveniste and Spindt, as 
mentioned before, distinguish between regular and occasional investors. There 
are  regular and many occasional investors and both have some information 
relevant to the expected value of the issuing firm's shares.  
Benveniste and Spindt consequently assume that each regular investor has 
one piece of information, that is either 'good' or 'bad', and that each piece of 
information has an equal (absolute) marginal impact on the stock's value. To 
reflect this, they write the expected price conditioned on the information of all  
regular investors in the form 
 
where  is the price when all information is good, and h is the number of regulars 
with good information. 
The price function is structured in this way to isolate a measure -  - of the 
marginal impact of each regular's information on the expected price of the issue.  
After considering regular investors, Benveniste and Spindt start their work 
on the occasional investors' impact on pricing decision. They stress that 
occasional investors have information which are independent of the regular 
investors' information. Conditioned on all the information possesses by both type 
of investors, Benveniste and Spindt state that the value of stock is  
 
where λ represents the effect of occasional investors' information on price. 
Benveniste and Spindt state that the market proceeds in two stages. In the 
first, the issue is premarket to regular investors, and in the second, the market is 
opened up to occasional investors, i.e. only regular investors are targeted in the 
premarket (which is considered as the first stage). 
Benveniste and Spindt assume that the aftermarket price reflects all the 
private information of all regular and occasional investors, i.e. that the aftermarket 
price is a full-information-revealing equilibrium price. Regular investors that decide 
to buy the shares in the premarket will factor their expectations about what the 
aftermarket price of the stock will be in their offer to buy. 
34 
 
Benveniste and Spindt stress some assumptions about regular investors. 
Namely, they assume that: 
1. Regular investors' investment preferences are identical and that each regular 
investor is willing to purchase up to  shares at a cost not exceeding his or 
her expectation of the aftermarket value of the stock, 
2. Regular investors' demand just exhaust the issue;  that is,  ,   
3. Regular investor's information is independent. Each regular investor's 
responses will be based on their subjective valuation of the stock and their 
expected profits. 
 
One major difference between Rock's97 and Benveniste and Spindt model 
can be noticed here. Namely, Rock bases his work on the assumption that 
informed demand is not high enough to exhaust the issue and Benveniste and 
Spindt, in the 2nd assumption, state that the informed investor's demand will 
exactly exhaust the issue.  
 
 
Nevertheless, Benveniste and Spindt continue their work by pointing out that 
regulars use their private information to compute subjective estimates of the 
aftermarket price that are superior to those of the underwriter and the issue firm.98  
To represent this, Benveniste and Spindt index the state of the premarket by 
the total number h of pieces of good information possessed by regular investors. 
Unconditionally, the probability of state h is  , where  
                           
But, from the vantage point of any regular investor who has a piece of good 
information, state  occurs with the conditional probability  and 
from the vantage point of any regular investor who has a piece of bad information, 
the probability of state  is , where 
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Consequently, Benveniste and Spindt state that regular's premarket 
reservation price is his or her conditional estimate of the aftermarket price. The 
reservation price of a regular investor with a piece of good information is 
 
and the reservation price of a regular investor with a piece of bad information is 
 
The empirical significance of the model parameter  is apparent from these 
empirical  expressions  for regular's  premarket  expectations.  As ,       
 represents the marginal ex ante value of a regulars' information. The more 
valuable private information relevant to the aftermarket stock price is, the greater  
will be.  
 Accordingly, Benveniste and Spindt try to explain how are these positive 
and negative information used to determine the offer price and allocation of the 
IPO. Assuming that regulars are truthful in declaring their information, Benveniste 
and Spindt argue that the underwriter can, based on these indications, compute 
the true conditional estimate for the aftermarket equilibrium price. 
 The following notation is used in discussing the offer price and allocation 
conditioned on the premarket indications of interest. 
   Offer  price  when   regular  investors  indicate  their  information  is    
           good (state ) 
 Shares  allocated  to an investor who indicates good in the premarket     
           when  others indicate good (state ) 
 Shares  allocated  to an investor  who  indicates bad in the premarket  
           when  others indicate good (state ) 
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 Regular investors declare their indication of interest, i.e. in this model 
declares either g (good) or  b (bad), and conditional on their indications and other 
investors' declarations,  offer price and their own allocation will be determined. 
 Investors have to be induced to disclose their information truthfully. First, an 
investor who has a good information about the firm must expect to profit more by 
declaring  than by declaring . Assuming that the other investors also indicate 
their information truthfully, the expected profit accruing to an investor truthfully 
announcing his piece of good information is the expected return between the 
aftermarket and premarket, i.e.   
 
 On the other hand, investor with a piece of good information who falsely 
declares bad information will be allocated a  portion and the offer price will reflect 
one less piece of good information. Such investor expects profit of   
 
 To induce the investors to be truthful,  must exceed . Using a 
fact that , (when additional good information is received, the new 
offer price will be higher for the margin impact, , of this new information) 
Benveniste and Spindt conclude that an investor with a piece of good information 
will declare it truthfully if  
 
 Second, investors must be assured of nonnegative expected profits from 
any premarket order they make because they cannot be forced to participate. 
Thus,  
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      Outcomes that would result in state  from a particular choice of offer price 
and allocation (OP&A) schedule  based on the premarket indications of interest 
are: 
Allocation to each  
Allocation to each  
Total shares presold  
Aftermarket sales  
Expected proceeds   
 In calculating the state  expected proceeds, Benveniste and Spindt 
assume that the expected value of  is zero. If the objective in choosing an offer 
price and allocation schedule based on the premarket indications of interest is to 
maximize the expected proceeds of the issue, the underwriter needs only, as 
Benveniste and Spindt argue, to settle on how much of the issue to presell. For 
example, Benveniste and Spindt suppose that the issuer decided to sell at least 
shares. Conditioned on , the proceeds-maximizing offer price and allocation 
schedule can be found among the solutions to: 
 
subject to 
 
                
                                            
                                     
                                     
Furthermore, for a specified level of presales, , Benveniste and Spindt 
state that  the proceeds-maximizing offer price and allocation schedule relating 
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indications of interest to the offer price and share allocation will have the following 
characteristics: 
  for every outcome , 
  for every  such that , 
 underpricing occurs in states where  
and the expected proceeds from the issue are 
 
 This finding also implies, as Benveniste and Spindt state, that regular 
investors who indicate bad information should be allocated the remaining  
shares in state . Benveniste and Spindt thence derive the expected underpricing:  
 
 Furthermore, Benveniste and Spindt elaborate the statement that expected 
underpricing arises to provide incentives for regular investors to reveal good 
information. They find out that, as the level of profit is determined by the allocation 
to regulars who declare b, underpricing will be minimized by giving priority to 
regulars who declare g. Benveniste and Spindt also state that the surplus will be 
targeted at regulars with good information most effectively by underpricing when 
all regulars who declare g receive allocation that is when  is high. Benveniste 
and Spindt also state correctly that, in the model with more types of information 
(usual model that occurs in real life),99 underpricing would be directly related to the 
quality of information. Empirical implications that Benveniste and Spindt derive 
from this findings are: 
 Underpricing is directly related to the ex ante marginal value of 
private information. 
 Underpricing is directly related to the level of presales. 
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 Underpricing is minimized if priority is given to orders from investors 
who indicate good information. 
 Underpricing is directly related to the level of interest in the 
premarket. 
Benveniste and Spindt argue that, as the level of underpricing depends on 
quantities allocated to investors who indicate low interest, underpricing can be 
minimized by including as many investors in the premarket as is practical and by 
doing this it will be possible to allocate small quantities to investors who indicate 
low interest. This statement holds, but is a bit in conflict with the work of Beatty 
and Ritter100, who state that the underpricing is equal to costs that investors have 
borne in the process of scrutinizing the firm and hence, as more investors are 
engaged in the premarket investigations, the aggregate costs will be higher 
causing the increasement of underpricing.101 Obviously, a tradeoff between this 
two factors will occur.102 
Relating to the underpricing phenomenon, Benveniste and Spindt continue 
their work by introducing a new variable  which is the present value of all 
expected future profits accruing to a regular investor who participates in the IPO.  
By introducing this variable into the analysis, effect of permitting the 
underwriter to expect investors to purchase shares of the current issue even if they 
will take a loss by doing so is created. The only condition is that this loss does not 
exceed the present value of the future expected profits. At this point, Benveniste 
and Spindt state an altered pricing constraint required to induce investors 
indicating low interest to purchase their allotted shares.  
This new condition is 
                                    
This is a strong incentive tool, while by introducing the possibility of being 
excluded from the future IPOs, the underwriter reduces the incentive for investors 
with good information to lie. The already stated condition,  
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describes the profit required to induce regulars with good information to truthfully 
reveal it. 
Benveniste and Spindt conclude this part of their work with the statement 
that the profit needed to induce regulars who have good information to reveal it is 
lower when the future profits are included in the model. Anyhow, the amount of 
overpricing is constrained by  and the underwriter has to provide regulars with 
some profit on average so that  is positive. 
Benveniste and Spindt conclude their work in this article assuming that the 
issuing firm can be described by a one-dimensional random variable  with a 
distribution function . Hence, Benveniste and Spindt state that the offer price 
and allocation schedule for each firm , satisfying the previous two equations, will 
be denoted as 
 
 Benveniste and Spindt argue that regular investors don't know in advance 
what their information about a firm will be. They rather face an ex ante probability 
 of having a good information about  and hence expect a profit from 's issue in 
a form of weighted average 
 
which equals 
 
Benveniste and Spindt conclude their work in this article with a statement 
that underpricing is induced by the underwriter's willingness to extract the 
information from regular investors. This information will be then useful in setting 
IPO offer price. They argue that, as the amount of information production 
increases, the expected secondary market price of firm is closer to its true     
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value.103  Underpricing compensates investors for revealing preferential 
information. Consequently, the more preferential information are revealed, the 
greater will the underpricing be. Price is namely adjusted for the positive impact of 
information, but it is adjusted only partially due to necessity of leaving some 
money on the table for information providers. In Benveniste and Spindt's model 
underpricing is hence a cost that the issuer has to bear in order to adequately 
compensate private information suppliers. 
 
  3.2. Winner's Curse Model 
Winner's Curse Model is also based on asymmetric information among 
investors. It was introduced by Rock [36] in 1986. Rock's work was already 
partially described in the Chapter 2.2.1. In this Chapter I will present Rock's article 
in more detail, and focus on the use of Rock's model in setting the IPO share 
price.      
 Rock recognizes two different groups of investors, namely informed 
investors, which are simply endowed with their preferential information (no 
information production costs in this model), and uninformed investors. Rock states 
that underpricing is necessary to hold the uninformed investors in the market. The 
model is based on the assumption that informed demand is not big enough to buy 
the whole issue and consequently the uninformed demand is also needed to raise 
funds. As explained in the Chapter 2.2.1., uninformed demand is only forthcoming 
if the issues are underpriced on average, i.e. if the issues are offered at a discount 
from their expected aftermarket share price.104  
Rock's builds his model on the simple consideration that there are two 
assets available for investment. One is safe, with return normalized to 1 and the 
other is one whose value (per share)  is uncertain. The latter asset is the one that 
is beeing issued. The model afterwards assumes that the issuer pre-selects an 
offer price, , and an offer quantity, , of shares. Rock also assumes that no re-
adjustment of price or quantity is allowed and consequently the issuer can 
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experience demand lower or bigger than supply. If demand exceeds supply, the 
investment banker can fill only a fraction of the order and hence rationing occurs. 
 When oversubscription occurs, Rock assumes that it occurs exclusively 
due to the large orders placed by investors who have favorable information about 
the prospects of the offering. This privileged sector of the market is what Rock 
calls 'the informed'. All other investors, including the issuer, are called 'the 
uninformed'. 
Informed demand, I, is no greater than mean value of the shares offered, 
, and the informed investors submit orders for the new shares whenever the 
realized value per share105, , exceeds the offer price, p. Hence, when , 
informed investors order I and when  there are no orders from  the informed 
investors. 
Unlike the informed investors,  the uninformed investors, who are N in 
number, cannot predicate the size of their order upon the realization of . Each 
uninformed investor wants to submit a fraction, T, of his wealth for the new issue 
(assumption is that they have homogeneous expectations about the distribution of 
, same wealth and the same utility). The combined dollar demand of the informed 
and uninformed is 
                                            NT + I    if   p <   
                                           NT          if   p >  
Since the demand fluctuates according to weather  is above or below p, 
the issuer must experience either excess supply or excess demand in one of the 
two states, and a particular mechanism for allocating rationed shares must be 
devised.  
In the state , the probability of reciving an allocation will be denoted as 
, and if  holds, the receiving-allication probability is denoted by   
The intuition based on  two equations stated above says that the probability 
of receiving an allocation of an underpriced issue is less than or equal to the 
probability of receiving an allocation of an overpriced issue. Rationing is 
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consequently 'bigger' for underpriced that for overpriced issues, i.e.  . This 
bias in allocation causes the uninformed investors to revise downward their 
valuation of the new shares. 
Therefore, as Rock states, to attract uninformed investors the offering, the 
issuer must price the shares at a discount. This discount can be interpreted as 
compensation for receiving a disproportionate number of overpriced stocks, when 
the informed demand is not forthcoming. 
Investor's terminal wealth is therefore a function of the aftermarket value of 
the new issue and the probability of receiving an allocation. Rock also states that 
investor's beliefs about the chances of being dealt a good or bad offer must equal 
the actual probabilities which arise from the allocation mechanism. 
Rock argues that the fact that uninformed investors earn approximately the 
risk-free rate in a large market is what actually determines their chances of 
receiving an allocation of good shares. Intuition behind this is straightforward; as 
the issue becomes more and more attractive, uninformed investors will receive 
allocation that is so rationed (his probability of receiving allocation will be so small) 
that the actual profits, no matter how big the underpricing is, will be at the level of 
risk-free rate conditional on the whole amount that was originally intended to be 
invested. 
This low probability is the smallest probability of obtaining rationed shares 
that an investor will tolerate before withdrawing from the market, given the offering 
price . This low probability function, , of receiving shares given offering price 
Rock names  'zero demand probability'. Accordingly, Rock states the full 
subscription price, which must be close to the solution of 
 
Furthermore, Rock describes the opportunity set an investor is facing and 
argues that, as the offer price is reduced, the offering becomes more and more 
subscribed, i.e. elicit larger uninformed orders.  
As the result of the uninformed investors, demand is, therefore, also 
growing in the state where the informed do not find the shares worth purchasing. 
At some point, the price is so low that the uninformed could by themselves fully 
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account for the issue. Rock calls this the 'full subscription price' – the price at 
which the issuer can rely on selling all the shares in the bad issue as well as in the 
good issue, and shows how to compute it 
 
  Moreover, Rock, given that the motive of going public is risk aversion on the 
part of the founders, employees and financial backers of the firm, states that the 
offer price cannot exceed the unconditional mean value of the shares, . If the 
price is greater that , Rock states that the uninformed would never submit an 
order. 
 Next Rock's supposition is about the collective preferences of the owners, 
which according to Rock can be expressed by a utility function: 
 
 Rock states that the owner's terminal wealth is a function of the true price 
(revealed in the aftermarket) and that the expected utility of the owners, 
accordingly, is: 
 
 
  
Under the assumption that  is uniform on , Rock states a new equation: 
 
Rock's interpretation of this expression is straightforward; the first term, 
 is the utility of the owners given the issue is completely subscribed at 
the price . The second term is a correction that depends upon the fraction of the 
issue subscribed by the uninformed: 
 
Using the definition of the probability of receiving an allocation , Rock 
writes the maximization problem: 
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For big markets, where the number of investors is large, probability of 
receiving allocation for uninformed investors is approximately equal to the zero 
demand probability,  and in this instance the maximization problem, as Rock 
states,becomes:  
 
Solution to the constrained distribution occurs at the boundary , and the 
owners choose the smallest discount which guarantees full subscription in every 
state. 
   
3.3. Cost of Information Acquisition Model  
 Cost of information acquisition Model, developed by Beatty and Ritter [4] in 
1986 is an extension of Rock's Winner's Curse Model. This Chapter will give a 
closer look to their work. 
The most important statements and empirical findings of this Model are, as 
Beatty and Ritter argued, that the equilibrium for informed investors occurs when 
their expected gains from receiving allocations in underpriced issues equal the 
costs of search for the information.106The underpricing is directly related to the ex 
ante uncertainty about the stock's price in a way that when the uncertainty of 
share's value rises, more effort has to be given in order to evaluate the share 
properly and hence more money has to be 'left on the table' to compensate 
investors for the evaluation costs incurred. Other way around, when ex ante 
uncertainty is high, the value of private information is also high and the underwriter 
must promise deeper underpricing to induce honest indications of interest.107 
 Consequently, as the number of informed bidders increase, the 
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underpricing will increase as well, due to necessity of compensating more 
investors for their incurred costs.108 Related to the work of Rock, who considers 
the adverse selection risk as a source of underpricing, it can be argued that, as the 
amount of information gathering (pool size) increases, the underpricing that is 
necessary to eliminate the adverse selection risk decreases, but on the other hand 
the underpricing that is necessary to cover information gathering costs increases, 
as will be shown in this Chapter. Therefore, the underpricing in a public offering 
with information gathering will be the maximum of these two and the optimal 
amount of information gathering can be viewed as the one that equates this 
different levels of underpricing.109 
 In that sense, Beatty and Ritter provide an intuition110 on why underpricing 
should increase with the ex ante uncertainty about the shares value. An investor 
who decides to scrutinize the firm actually invests in a call option on the IPO 
shares, the option which will be exercised if the share value exceeds the strike (i.e. 
offer) price.  As the value uncertainty increases, the value of the option increases 
as well. Consequently, the greater valuation uncertainty is, the more investors will 
become informed. This will aggravate the winner's curse problem that uninformed 
investors are faced with and enlarge the sum of money that has to be left on the 
table to compensate investors for their information acquisition costs. 
 In Beatty and Ritter's equilibrium, investors incurring evaluation costs will 
earn sufficient profits to cover them. And that is what creates winner's curse for the 
so called uniformed, i.e. 'representative', investors who intend to free ride. Faced 
with this winner's curse problem, as mentioned already, representative 
(uninformed) investor will place purchase order only if IPOs are on average 
underpriced. 
 When information production is costly, underwriters need to focus on 
another important implication, i.e. how much information production to induce. This 
will be more discusses in the Chapter 3.4. 
                                                          
 
108
 see  Chemmanur,  Thomas J.,  1993,  The Pricing  of  Initial  Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with 
Information Production, Journal of Finance 48, pp 299. 
 
109
 see Maksimovid, V., and P. Pichler, 2006, Structuring the Initial Offering: Who to Sell To and How To Do 
It, Review of Finance 10, pp 22. 
 
110
 see Ljungqvist, A.,  IPO  Underpricing,  2004,  Handbooks in Finance:  Empirical  Corporate  Finance, 
Salomon Center, Stern School of Business, New York University and CEPR, pp. 15. 
47 
 
 In their Model, Beatty and Ritter assume that an issuing firm is uncertain 
about its value per share. It must first set an offering price, OP, and then solicit 
purchase orders from the public at this price. If the shares are oversubscribed, 
rationing in proportion to the excess demand occurs. Potential investors are also 
uncertain about the value of a share. But for a cost c, as Beatty and Ritter assume, 
they can become informed about the price per share, v, that will prevail once the 
stock starts trading. Investors who do not incur this costs are termed uninformed 
investors, and their knowledge about v is limited to knowing its probability density 
function, denoted by f (v). Issuing firms and their investment bankers are assumed 
by Beatty and Ritter to be among the uninformed, i.e. to be uncertain about the 
true value per share. Otherwise there would be no need to underprice, as Beatty 
and Ritter state correctly. 
 Informed investors, each of whom has investable wealth of , (original 
wealth minus the information acquisition costs) will submit purchase orders only if 
the offering is underpriced, i.e.  if   (v > OP). As mentioned already, this behavior 
by informed investors creates an adverse selection problem for uninformed 
investors. For underpriced issues (v > OP), both informed and uninformed 
investors will submit purchase orders, and uninformed investors will be allocated 
only some of the shares that trade at a premium in the aftermarket. Instead of that, 
for overpriced issues where v < OP, only uninformed investors submit purchase 
orders. Consequently, they are allocated with 100 % of all the issue that trade at a 
discount in the aftermarket. 
 Beatty and Ritter state that, if an uninformed investor is allocated shares in 
an IPO, there is a greater than usual chance that the issue will start trading at a 
discount in the aftermarket. Therefore, for an uninformed investor the expected 
return conditional upon being allocated shares is less than the expected return 
conditional upon submitting a purchase order. But an uninformed investor will 
participate in the market only if the expected return conditional upon being 
allocated shares is non-negative. This can only happen if, on average, issuers 
underprice their shares.  
 Beatty and Ritter argue that the number of investors who choose to become 
informed is endogenous. In the equilibrium, this condition converges into two 
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equations. These two conditions are (i) zero expected profits for informed 
investors, and (ii) zero expected profits for uninformed investors.  
The first condition can be expressed as 
                                                                              
where Beatty and Ritter term N as the number of informed investors, c as the cost 
per investor of becoming informed,  as the fraction of shares allocated to 
informed investors when an offering is underpriced111, OP as the offering price, n 
as the number of shares and v as the after-market price.  
 This equation simply states that the sum of all information costs (of all 
investors that have choose to become informed) equal the profits that this 
informed investors gain via receiving the allocation in the underpriced issues. The 
left-hand side is the aggregate cost of becoming informed. The right-hand side is 
the proportion of each underpriced issue that will be allocated to informed 
investors multiplied by the gross profits on underpriced issues.  
          The second equilibrium condition that Beatty and Ritter state, is the zero 
expected profits for the uninformed, which occurs when the aggregate losses on 
overpriced issues (the uninformed get all of the losing issue) equal the uninformed  
Investors' share of the gross profits on underpriced issues: 
         
          Beatty and Ritter argue that equations  and hold for any 
probability density function for the aftermarket price. These equations imply that, 
due to the winner´s curse problem facing uninformed investors, all of the profits 
accruing to investors due to underpricing will be received by informed investors. 
Investors seeking these profits, however, will incur sufficient costs so that the 
aggregate costs of becoming informed equal the amount of money ´left on the 
table: 
                                                       
                                                          
111
  Do not mix this with the   in Chapter 3.1. 
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     In this equation, the number of investors who choose to become informed, 
, determines the required  amount  of  underpricing, . The decision to 
become informed is analogous to the decision to buy call option giving the right to 
buy shares if  . Just as with standard option pricing analysis, this option is 
worth more the greater is the dispersion of , which for few issues corresponds to 
greater ex ante uncertainty. Beatty and Ritter argue that, since the price of the 
option is the fixed cost , the greater is the ex ante uncertainty, the greater will the 
number of investors who choose to become informed be. This way they have 
found a positive relation between ex ante uncertainty and the degree of 
underpricing of IPOs. 
 One can argue that the costs of becoming informed are not fixed, i.e. they 
rise with the rising ex ante uncertainty and thus the number of investors who 
choose to become informed is not rising in exactly the same proportion with the ex 
ante uncertainty. But Beatty and Ritter did not quest this hypothesis. 
In addition, Beatty and Ritter formally demonstrate their underpricing result. 
In this demonstration, they denote the fraction of underpriced issues allocated by 
informed investors, , be given by 
 
 
where  is the investment per informed investor.  With this expression, 
Beatty and Ritter assume that aggregate uninformed demand is sufficient to fully 
subscribe an issue. Consequently, for underpriced issue, aggregate informed 
demand is given by  and aggregate uninformed demand is equal to 
. 
Now,  Beatty  and  Ritter  denote  the  after-market  price,  ,  as   
   / , on , where  replaces  and  replaces  in 
the limits of integration in eq.  and . 
         Performing the integration in eq.  using a uniform distribution and 
solving for ,  Beatty and Ritter conclude that the number of informed investors 
per share results in 
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Performing the integrations in equation  results in 
 
Beatty and Ritter conclude that the equations   and hold for 
parameter values of  and  such that the number of informed investors,  
is strictly positive. If this is not the case, there is no adverse selection against the 
uninformed. If there is no adverse selection, Beatty and Ritter argue that a pooling 
equilibrium would exist in which there is no underpricing. 
In the two-equation system given by  and , Beatty and Ritter 
find that the endogenous variables are , the number of informed investors, and 
, the optimal offering price.  
         Beatty and Ritter now start equating equations  and what 
results in a quadratic equation for the issuing firm's optimal offering price: 
 
 
where .  is the cost of becoming informed as a fraction of the 
investable wealth of the informed. This quadratic equation  has roots of 
      
 
Of two roots, Beatty and Ritter correctly conclude that the  root is not 
economically meaningful, while in that the offering price would be less than , the 
lower limit of probability density function for the aftermarket price.   
Beatty and Ritter conclude that this would mean that there is no possibility 
of a loss for any investor submitting a purchase order. Thus, the unique offering 
price is given by the  root. 
          Before analyzing the effect of a decrease in the dispersion of possible 
aftermarket prices on the optimal , Beatty and Ritter find that it will be useful to 
rewrite expression , noting that 
 
51 
 
Beatty and Ritter consequently find that the equilibrium offering price is 
therefore 
 
 
3.4. Ownership Dispersion Model  
Ownership Dispersion Model is a model made by Booth and Chua [10] in 
the year 1996 and its main finding is that the demand for ownership dispersion 
affects IPO (under)pricing. Booth and Chua argue that owners' value more 
dispersed ownership structure, as that may result in more liquid secondary market, 
which in turn increases the share price. In this Chapter the work of Booth and 
Chua will be explained.  
Booth and Chua start their work with the assumption that, for an issue, , an 
investor, , can further improve his estimate of the market price per share, , for 
a cost . 
After incurring this costs, investor compares his improved estimates of 
value with the final offer price, OP, to determine whether or not to bid for the 
shares. 
Compared to uninformed investors, who choose not to incur information 
costs, Booth and Chua assume that informed investors are more likely to 
participate in secondary-market trading and future offerings. They argue that the 
size of the potential-investor base is important in promoting secondary-market 
liquidity.  
One of the main assumptions of Booth and Chua's work in this framework is 
that the number of investors encouraged to incur information costs, n, is set by the 
issuer in conjunction with the investment banker. Investment banker can namely 
promote the issue and encourage the information production that will be sufficient 
to induce oversubscription. 
Booth and Chua assume that investment bankers first solicit potential 
investors with lower information costs to investigate the issue. Subsequent 
investors who investigate the issue incur a cost that increases at an increasing 
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rate, i.e. the total information costs, , represents a function with positive first 
and second derivatives;       
                       and  
To achieve a preferred level of oversubscription, Booth and Chua argue that 
the investment banker must first encourage an adequate number of investors to 
purchase information. In this framework, issue proceeds,  (here equal to final 
offer price, ) are maximized, with investors recovering their information costs, 
when 
 
where 
  issue proceeds 
 investment banker's estimate of value at the optimal level of 
oversubscription; this function Booth and Chua assume to be 
increasing at a decreasing rate 
 total information costs for all potential investors at the optimal level 
of oversubscription; this function Booth and Chua assume to be 
increasing at an increasing rate; 
 optimum number of potential investors purchasing information.  
Consequently, in an equilibrium, maximizing proceeds involves calculating 
the estimated value and setting the final offer price (OP), taking into account the 
number of potential investors purchasing information, such that 
 
This equation states that initial returns to the winning bidders equal the total 
information costs for all potential investors. 
Booth and Chua conclude that the expected value of the winning bid is 
lower than the expected value of the asset. In models of this type, potential 
investors enter the auction process until the winner's expected profit equals the 
sum of all bidders' information costs. 
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   Booth and Chua now try to estimate the optimum number of potential 
investors purchasing information, , that will maximize the issue proceeds while 
investors recover their pre-bid information costs.  
   In this framework, Booth and Chua argue that  increases with the 
level of oversubscription, . They give two grounds for this assumption: First, value 
increases when the issue is widely promoted since the most optimistic investors 
are more likely to be bidding for shares. Secondly, by observing that the issue is 
being widely marketed, investors estimate a certain level of liquidity for the share 
in the secondary market and set their estimate of value accordingly. 
   Booth and Chua assume that total information costs, , also increase 
with , since more investors purchasing the information are expected to be 
compensated in equilibrium. Since an increase in  leads to an increase in both 
 and , offer price (OP) can either increase or decrease.  In equilibrium, 
following conditions have to be satisfied:                                    
 
 
  The intuition is straightforward; Booth and Chua state that when 
, then . Therefore,  increases with 
oversubscription because the rate of increase in  is greater than the rate of 
increas in , i.e. greater than the cost associated  with informing the marginal 
investor. 
On the other hand, when , then , which 
actually means that  will decrease with oversubscription. Booth and Chua argue 
that  is hence maximized at , when , i.e. when 
.  
At , investment bankers have promoted oversubscription to the point 
where the benefit in terms of the increase in expected value is equal to the 
information cost of a marginal investor. At , the issuer maximizes total proceeds 
(here, equal to ), subject to investors recovering information costs through initial 
underpricing.  
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         Moreover, Booth and Chua model the optimal number of shares issued 
(ownership dispersion), , consistent with issuers maximizing proceeds and 
potential investors recouping pre-bid information costs across multiple issues. At 
,  is maximized. 
This occurs when 
 
or  
                                  
Booth and Chua hence incorporate secondary liquidity in their model. When 
this secondary-market liquidity is incorporated into potential investors' estimate of 
market value, issuers' proceeds are maximized when the rate of increase in total 
market value equals the rate of increase in total information costs (assuming the 
optimal level of oversubscription per allocation).  
At distributions greater than , the increase in total information costs would 
exceed the benefits of increased secondary-market liquidity, resulting in lower total 
proceeds. At distribution less than , the savings in information costs are offset by 
the decrease in value due to lower secondary-market liquidity. Therefore, at   the 
difference between  and   is the biggest.    
Booth and Chua argue that, since information are costly to produce, 
underpricing is used to compensate investors for incurring pre-bid information 
costs in IPOs. Their model illustrates that an optimal level of underpricing is 
reached when the issuer maximizes proceeds. Optimal ownership dispersion, , 
is partly determined by the value of the secondary market liquidity. Booth and 
Chua argue that maximizing proceeds involves promoting secondary-market 
liquidity through initial ownership dispersion and oversubscription to the point 
where the rate of increase in total market value equals the rate of increase in total 
information costs. Related to the work of Booth and Chua, Maksimović and Pichler 
[30] on the other hand argue112 that for any given amount of information gathering, 
wealth loss due to that information gathering is a fixed cost. Contrarily, the wealth 
loss that is caused by adverse selection risk is variable cost which increases with 
                                                          
112
  see Maksimovid, V., and P. Pichler, 2006, Structuring the Initial Offering: Who to Sell To and How To Do 
It, Review of Finance 10, pp 22. 
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the issue size. The optimal amount of information gathering will therefore, as 
Maksimović and Pichler state, increase in the issue size. 
 
3.5. When-Issue Market 
When-issue market is actually a market for shares that have not been 
issued yet, but whose issue is already announced. My effort on describing When-
issue market will be based on the work of Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper [1], as 
they argue that when-issue market is a good way of pricing the IPO shares. When-
issue market, as stated by Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper, can not completely 
eliminate bookbuilding but can reduce underpricing. 
 Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper state that in auctions, same as in 
bookbuilding, the pricing relevant information is obtained directly from potential 
buyers in the primary market. This information revelation consequently incurs 
some costs for the issuer. Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper argue that the 
information relevant for pricing IPO shares may be revealed through trading in 
related securities in a pre-auction, ''when-issued'', market before these securities 
are offered in the primary market. The intuition is that this ''when-issued'' market 
can release the information that may affect investor's bidding strategies in the 
auction and thus the price(s) at which the securities are sold. When-issued trading 
therefore provides pricing-relevant information for free because when-issued 
prices are publicly observable.  
An underwriter by observing when-issue trading can gauge the market's 
interest for an IPO and thus the bookbuilding mechanism can be used only as a 
means for distributing IPO shares and not any more for obtaining costly 
information. Authors differentiate between bookbuilding that occurs prior to the 
opening of when-issued market and bookbuilding that occurs concurrently with 
when-issued market trading.  
Anyhow, issuer has to have a notion of IPO share price, while when-issue 
trading begins only after the posting of an indicative range for the IPO offering 
price and lasts till the day before the start of secondary market trading of IPO 
shares. That gives the traders an indication of how IPO shares will be priced in the 
primary market. 
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When-issued market can represent a potentially valuable source of free 
information for IPO pricing, but it does not unconditionally imply that this trading 
can supplant bookbuilding as an indicator of how IPOs should be priced. Namely, 
when-issued market may not be able to open on its own. As Aussenegg, Pichler 
and Stomper argue, prospective sellers may stay out of the market because of the 
possibility of a "squeeze", which can occur if short sellers in the when-issued 
market are not awarded securities in the auction. 
Nevertheless, it appears as Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper state that 
when-issued market provides an indication of how IPO should be priced in the 
primary market. It revises this information relevant for IPO pricing, but the offer 
price is not fully adjusted relative to this information. This under revision can be 
viewed as an evidence of rents that investors receive for providing underwriters 
with information. However, Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper argue that these 
rents are not paid for information that underwriters obtain after the opening of 
when-issued trading. Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper argue that lack of such 
phenomenon suggests that, once when-issued trading commences, bookbuilding 
is not a source of costly information for IPO pricing. Any such informational role of 
bookbuilding is therefore confined to the period before the opening of the when-
issued market, as the authors differentiate between bookbuilding that occurs prior 
to the opening of the when-issued market and bookbuilding that occurs 
concurrently with when-issued market trading. Indeed, Aussenegg, Pichler and 
Stomper's finding suggest that underwriters do gather information through 
bookbuilding in order to set price ranges before when-issued trading begins. 
Consequently, there is a value to gathering information before setting the 
offer price range. The range is hence a signal of information held by the 
underwriter. 
The main finding of this article would be that, if when-issue trading of IPO 
shares reveals investors' private information for free, then there is no need to pay 
them informational rents once when-issued trading commences and therefore the 
underpricing should be smaller.  
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4. Indications of Interest and Theoretical Implications 
In this Chapter the process of collecting potential investor's interest will be 
described. A significant effort will be given on explaining the Bookbuilding process, 
on the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon and on the process of allocation of 
(rationed) shares. 
 
4.1. Bookbuilding 
 Bookbuilding procedure is a process of soliciting bids for shares from 
potential investors prior to pricing an equity issue.113 After the bids have been 
solicited, the investment banker uses his discretionary right aligned with the 
issuers' goals to price the issue. Subsequent to this process the investment banker 
allocates the shares at his discretion to the investors. Bookbuilding can be viewed 
as an information gathering process because the offer price and allocation of 
shares depend on information exchanged, as it involves information 'flow from 
investor to the issuer and vice versa'114. 
The bookbuilding process is often used for pricing the IPOs. The informed 
bidders, who provide information about the share's value in their bids, are 
expected to receive favorable allocations, especially when the issue is heavily 
oversubscribed.115  Therefore in exchange for truthful revelation, investors receive 
some rents. The intuition is that if the investment bank can allocate more shares to 
the bidders who provide valuable information, less underpricing will be required.  
 Indications of interest116 consist of bids for quantity of shares desired and 
may include a maximum price (limit price) that an investor is willing to pay, or 
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some other information that is relevant for underwriter to price the issue. With all 
the information collected investment banker constructs a demand curve for the 
shares offered.  It is important to say the issue price is then not set according to 
any explicit rule, but rather based on 'the investment banker's interpretation of 
investor's indications of interest'.117 As the information contained in the bids is 
used in pricing the issue, investors that submitted the bids consequently lose their 
informational advantage. 
 To guarantee that investors accurately report their preferential information 
to the investment banker, the investment bank has to set the prices and 
allocations so that it is optimal for them to do so. Consequently, investment banker 
faces a set of "truth-telling" constraints118 to induce informed investors to tell the 
truth. They must be offered some combination of more IPO allocations and 
underpricing when they indicate a willingness to purchase shares at a high 
price.119 Therefore some money has to be 'left on the table' to induce truth-telling. 
 Related to the work of Booth and Chua [10] and Beatty and Ritter [4] 
another big advantage of the bookbuilding process is the underwriter's 
discretionary right to choose the number of investors that enters the bookbuilding 
procedure120. This discretionary right will guarantee the sufficient number, but not 
too many, of investors who are involved121. Therefore the investment banker will 
be able to assume and control the amount of cost investors incurring in 
scrutinizing the firm. Moreover, the issuer will select the accuracy of each 
investor's information by setting the prices and allocations that will induce 
investors to purchase the optimal amount of information.122 Underwriter has to 
trade-off the increase in information accuracy against a corresponding increase in 
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required underpricing which will be necessary to compensate investors for their 
evaluation costs. 
The bookbuilding procedure is similar to an auction, although some 
important differences that are worth mentioning arise. The most important 
difference is that the pricing and allocation rules are not announced in the 
bookbuilding procedure.123 During the auctions (sometimes called the open offer 
systems) securities are priced and allocated according to explicit rules,124 i.e. are 
based only on current bids. In the auctions there is no possibility, contrary to the 
bookbuilding, to coordinate the number of investors involved in the process. 
Therefore it may occur that too few investors enter the process causing the offer to 
fall, or it may occur that too many investors enter and bid all of the potential profits 
away and consequently prevent investors from recovering their information 
costs.125 Investors have namely no guarantee that if they scrutinize the firm they 
will have a reasonable chance to obtain shares.126   
Contrary to the bookbuilding procedure, in the auctions there is no 
possibility to refuse any order for any arbitrary reason while allocations are 
determined solely by bids127. Thus two investors that submit the same bid have the 
same ex ante expected allocation, whatever their identity is.128 Obviously the 
bookbuilding process gives the underwriter control over the process, which is not 
the case in the auctions. 
For both methods, the expected proceeds will be equal to the offer price 
minus expected aggregate information costs of investors. The difference is that in 
bookbuilding there is a greater ability to control information expenditures and thus 
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the expected proceeds as well. In the bookbuilding procedure there is no 
undersubscription possibility since the underwriter will recruit a sufficient number 
of investors that will have incentive to attend the road show and consider the 
offering.129  In the bookbuilding, unlike the auctions, underwriter has the control 
over information expenditures and the underpricing is expected to be lowered.130  
 Without the ability to make allocations dependent on the information 
reported, there is no way for underwriters to give investors the incentive to report 
their information accurately.131 Consequently this will also lead to more 
underpricing.  
Another popular method of selling shares is Hybrid offering. This is where 
bookbuilding is used to gather information from institutional investors and the 
public offer tranche is used for local retail investors which do not participate in the 
price-setting process.132 
As mentioned already in the bookbuilding procedure there is no pricing133 
and allocation rules. Investment banker uses his knowledge and experience in line 
with the issuers' interest to price and allocate the shares to the desired investors. 
The desired investors are mainly the ones who gave some valuable information 
regarding to the IPO share price and did not free-ride on other investor's 
information, who have long term relationship134 with the investment banker, or by 
some other conjecture viewed as desirable for receiving an allocation (for example 
preferred ownership structure, nationality of the bidders, favorable treatment of 
domestic investors etc.). Investment bank may also follow its own interest by 
favoring its "friends," who in return can help the bank in other circumstances. 
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In a bookbuilding procedure, unlike the auctions, investor's bids are not 
presenting a commitment to purchase; they present merely an indication of 
interest. It is however very rare for any investor to abandon its own bid.135 
The bookbuilding procedure begins with the investment bank announcing a 
price range (after conducting due-diligence of the firm and observing other factors 
that may influence the share's performance), which is only indicative and then the 
investment banker starts the 'road show' in order to market the issue and solicit 
the indications of interest from potential investors who bid for the shares. 
 The book contains each bid submitted, identification of the bidder, the 
number of shares requested, date when the bid was submitted, possible revisions 
of the bid and a limit price (i.e. how much the investor is willing to pay) if 
specified.136 
Normally the book does not include the retail demand, which is handed 
separately for a prespecified number of shares.137 
There are three types of bids an investor can submit:138  
1) 'Strike bid', which is actually a request for shares regardless of the issue 
price (bidder submitting a strike bid is willing to pay the issue price). It can be 
submitted either in the number of shares desired (regardless the price per share), 
or in the currency amount desired to invest (regardless the amount of shares that 
enters in that sum). 
2) 'Limit bid', which specifies the maximum price that the bidder is willing to 
pay for the shares. 
3) 'Step bid'; if the bidder submits a demand schedule as a step function 
(step bid is like a sequence of limit bids, i.e. it states multiple limit prices).  
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Actually, any of these bids can be submitted for a specified quantity of 
shares or for a given amount of money regardless the issue price. Limit and step 
bids are categorized139 as price sensitive bids. 
 'Currency bids' define those bids that specify an amount of money. The 
number of shares requested by currency bids changes with the issue price.140 
 Most interesting from a rational investor's viewpoint are the strike bids, and 
the question why do investors submit strike bids. Strike bid could be submitted 
when the investor is uncertain about valuation and is simply prepared to accept 
consensus price. It is also possible that investors place a value on the shares that 
is at least at the top141 of the indicative price range, in which case a strike bid can 
be read as a limit bid at the top of the range.142 
Underwriter prefers limit bids, while with submitting limit bid, 'an informed 
investor reveals his information. If all bids were for example strike bids for fixed 
quantity of shares, the aggregate demand would be perfectly inelastic and the 
book would provide no indication of how to price the issue, other than through the 
overall level of demand. On the other hand, limit bids provide specific information 
about the elasticity of the demand and give the underwriter a better idea of the true 
value of the share and  where to price the issue within the price range'.143 
According to this conjecture, if the purpose of bookbuilding is to extract 
information, limit and specially step bids should be treated more favorably in the 
allocation of shares while they provide more information.144  
 It is assumed that only informed investors submit limit bids. If an uninformed 
investor submits a limit bid, two types of costs will occur:145 If the limit price is too 
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low, the investment bank might set the issue price higher than the limit price and 
the investor would obtain no shares. But if the investor's limit price is too high, he 
might146 influence the price upwards and receive overpriced shares. The 
underwriter may also reject this order finding it to be as "disguised market orders", 
i.e. quasi-market orders, placed high only to disguise the underwriter and not 
actually be based on share's evaluation.147 There are some evidences that retail 
investors much more likely than institutional investors place these high and 
uninformative bids.148 
 When the submitting period is over, the investment banker 'aggregates all of 
the bid information, constructs a demand curve and determines the issue price, 
which is usually set so that the total demand is larger than the number of 
shares'149, i.e. offer price is below the market clearing price. 
 After the issue price is set, the investment banker asks the investors to 
confirm their indications of interest150, and decides how to allocate the total shares 
among investors without following any explicit rule.151 The main result of such 
behavior is that bidders are not rationed equally, i.e. pro rata; instead of that some 
are rationed in favor and some are rationed against.152 
 The share distribution is assumed not to influence the pricing decision; for 
example the possibility that the investment banker would set a low price to ensure 
that a particular limit order is hit, is excluded.153 Logically as the oversubscription 
increases, investment banker gets more and more discretion in allocating the 
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shares, whereas in the other extreme, if the demand is exactly equal to supply, he 
has no discretion while all orders are filled by 100 %.154  
 Investment banker allocates some shares to the individual investors, who 
are typically small and uninformed occasional players on the stock market, but as 
they behave like the noise traders, their sentiment is likely to affect the aftermarket 
share's performance. IPO price is set to partially reflect their bullishness or 
bearishness,155 because they are assumed to participate in the aftermarket only if 
they are bullish about the share's performance. If retail investors are bullish about 
the shares' aftermarket performance, they will buy the shares that are flipped by 
institutional investors. Otherwise, the aftermarket is assumed to be restricted to 
institutional investors.156 
 McDonald and Jacquillat [32] in their article give an example of IPO pricing 
and allocation, which I'll elaborate at this place in order to closely explain pricing 
and allocation process. 
 In McDonald and Jacquillat's [32] article there is an example given of IPO 
pricing and allocation, which I will elaborate at this place in order to closely explain 
pricing and allocation process. 
 The authors elaborate a French company, that wanted to issue 100,000 
shares and the minimum acceptable price (after conducing due-diligence and 
other valuation methods) was set at 850 francs per share. Subsequent to soliciting 
investor's interest and setting the demand curve, the apparent market clearing 
price was about 1,180 francs per share. The committee regarded this price to be 
'too high' in terms of their expectation of market price in the aftermarket and has 
decided upon 1,025 francs per share as the offering price. The bids at 1,500 
francs or more, totaling 4,000 shares, were rejected157 as 'disguised market 
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orders', i.e. they were conceived as too high to be credible, and thus treated 
equivalent to a strike bid with defrauding intention.  Bids between 1,350 and 1,500 
francs per share were accepted in fully and allocated 32,000 shares of the issue, 
bids between 1,120 and 1,350 francs were accepted at 50% of the quantity 
requested and allocated 43,000 shares, and bids between 1,025 and 1,350 francs 
were 30% filled with 25,000 shares, therefore a total issue of 100,000 shares were 
allocated at the common offering price of 1.025 francs per share. 
 A question that arises is why the issuer and the underwriter decided to 
allocate the shares at 1,025 francs when they could have been actually sold at the 
market clearing price, 1,180 francs, i.e. for 15% more. Maybe the reason for that 
was the insurance hypothesis of the underpricing, as discussed in the         
Chapter 2.2.2., but that hypothesis was stated as more US centric and this IPO 
was located in France. Why the offer price was set at 1,025 francs may be, as 
McDonald and Jacquillat argue, that the partial allocation ensured wider 
distribution of the shares, as maybe desired by the issuing company. On the other 
hand a circular process of reinforcement in previous auctions may have led 
bidders to expect partial allocation and a downward adjustment of the apparent 
market clearing price in determining the offering price, so that the apparent market 
clearing price represents a consistently upward-biased estimate of true market 
clearing price. Following passage will show that the investment bank would lose its 
reputation if the shares were priced beyond the initial offer range; the reason why 
the price was not set at the 1,180 francs could be that the top of the initial price 
range was beneath the market clearing price. It is namely important to stay within 
the range to be able to extract private information from investors.158 
 The huge difference of US and Europe bookbuilding procedures is that in 
the US the interactions with potential investors prior to registration, which is routine 
in Europe, are strictly prohibited.  The information gathered during the pre-
marketing phase can be taken into account when setting the initial indicative price 
range. This European-centric ability to canvass the opinion of investors prior the 
setting the initial indicative price range adds complexity to the information 
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revelation problem.159 The intuition is straightforward; knowing that positive 
feedback will drive up the offer price, investors have an incentive to understate 
their beliefs.160 
This incentive distortion can be resolved by the bank’s commitment not to 
exceed the indicative price range regardless of the feedback during the 
bookbuilding effort it will receive and to favor all other (‘‘uninformed’’) investors in 
the event of oversubscription.161 
By committing to favor uninformed investors, investment bank frightens the 
informed investors with the possibility of withholding allocation if the private 
information exogenously reveals to uninformed investors prior to the completion of 
the offering. With this threat, and a firm commitment to the upper bound of the 
indicative price range, informed investors run the risk of being crowded out at the 
offering if they understate their beliefs in communications, on which the investment 
bank conditions the indicative price range.162 
The threat that uninformed investors will become exogenously informed and 
crowd out the informed investors' disciplines informed investors.163 Although the 
banks optimal ex post response to overbidding would be to raise the price range, 
uninformed investors would never oversubscribe a new issue if they anticipated a 
price increase. The disciplining role of uninformed investors would then be lost.164 
That is the reason why the final price is set within and very often at the 
boundaries of the price range in Europe, while in the US the final price is 
frequently set outside the initial price range.165 
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4.2. Partial Adjustment phenomenon 
 Partial adjustment phenomenon was already mentioned in previous 
Chapters, but will be discussed here in more detail. This phenomenon was 
introduced by Benveniste and Spindt [6] and explained by Hanley [20]. The 
phenomenon is actually the common observed fact that those issues that have 
positive revisions in the offer price, due to the positive information revealed during 
the pre-issue period, will show more underpricing than other IPOs.166 It can be 
also deducted, in that sense, that the relation of the final offer price to the range of 
anticipated offer prices disclosed in the preliminary prospectus is a good predictor 
of the amount of underpricing on the first trading day.167 
  The conclusion is that instead of raising the final offer price to the expected 
market value of equity on the initial trading day, underwriters only partially adjust 
the price upwards.168 
 A most common accepted explanation of partial adjustment phenomenon is 
that investors must have an incentive to reveal positive information. When good 
information is revealed, the offer price will be adjusted to these new findings, but 
not completely while some of the profits have to be left for the information supplier. 
The more valuable the information is, the more wealth has to be paid for receiving 
it while there is greater incentive to withhold it. This payment is made via 
(under)pricing and allocation schedule that maximizes the investors’ total expected 
profit.169 
 If the issue is oversubscribed, then underwriters may not be able to fully 
compensate investors for their truthful revelations by simply increasing the number 
of shares to be issued. Consequently, if the shares are rationed, the offer price will 
only partially adjust to good information and underpricing will be used together with 
increased share allocation to reward truth-telling investors. 
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The issuer faces thus a perplexing situation170: the bad news that a lot of 
money was left on the table arrived at the same time with the good news of high 
proceeds and a high market price. Because a lot of money is left on the table 
almost exclusively when it is packaged with good news, issuers rarely complain. 
The possible complaint could though be in the sense that initial price range could 
have been wider, or shifted towards bigger prices. 
 Nevertheless, issuers with the greatest underpricing are happy because 
they ended up with greater proceeds (and wealth) than they originally 
anticipated.171 
 
4.3. Allocation and Rationing phenomenon 
     Allocation and Rationing phenomenon have been mentioned already,172 
while it cannot be given a detailed overview about the bookbuilding without 
mentioning allocation and rationing. Allocation and rationing are the two sides of 
the same coin, and come along with the bookbuilding, where the underwriter has 
the discretion right regarding allocation and rationing. 
The basement of this phenomenon is the underpricing, while the 
underpricing creates excess demand and consequently the underwriter has to 
decide whom to allocate rationed shares and how much to allocate per single 
investor. This is one of the most salient features of the IPO market, while once the 
offer price is set, any excess demand for the issue creates a situation of quantity 
rationing, rather than further adjustment of the offering price.173 
Assuming the investment bankers act in the interest of the issuer, they will 
allocate shares to those investors who provide positive information about the 
issue's value, conditional on desired ownership structure and other goals that the 
issuer has. For example, shares could be also allocated to those investors who 
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buy hot and cold IPO's, thus reducing the average underpricing.174 Stoughton and 
Zechner [45], in line with Jensen and Meckling [25], argue that the desired 
ownership structure can depend on the possibility that the block holder will have 
an incentive to monitor the firm's management (which is an important feature when 
ownership and control are not in the same hand any more) and thus discipline 
them. Ownership structure affects namely the efficiency of corporate governance 
and thus the intrinsic value of the firm. 
Underwriters have to grade the amount of flippers (i.e. those who sell the 
shares immediately after receiving them) and to gauge the effect of their shares on 
the market once when the trading commences. On the one hand, flippers are good 
for liquid aftermarket trading and helping the price to jump to the unsustainable 
levels, but on the other hand, if the demand is weak, the flipped shares can reduce 
the price substantially.175 
Jenkinson and Jones [21] state that investment bankers, when asked about 
allocation 'claim that they are influenced by the "quality" of the bidder.' But in none 
of the books Jenkinson and Jones analyzed did the bookrunner attempt to make a 
systematic and objective ranking of bidders by their quality. When pressed to 
define a high-quality investor, Jenkinson and Jones state that many investment 
banks will relate quality to the probability of the investor being a longer-term holder 
of the stock.176  
Jenkinson and Jones also state that larger bids receive larger pro rata 
allocations, and that price sensitive bids are rationed less. It is also important to 
mention that the bid submitted early in the bookbuilding process will be considered 
as more valuable, as well as the revised bids. 
If the purpose of the bookbuilding is to elicit information from the investors, 
then the most informative bids should face the smallest rationing. The allocation 
process is mainly determined by rewarding the information providers, but the other 
issues, as like business relationship with the underwriter, desired shareholders 
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structure, nationality of the bidders etc. are also relevant for the allocation. What 
factors do prevail and what are the relative strengths of them remains in the 
underwriter's discretion and can vary through different IPOs. 
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  5. Conclusion 
The IPO process is not easy, as it requires skills, experience, established 
business connections, special knowledge about firm valuation, about identification 
of market conditions, investors' sentiment and their aftermarket conduct etc. The 
most prominent issues of IPO process is how the price of IPO shares is 
determined and how the shares are allocated to the investors that wanted to buy 
them. 
IPO shares should be valued as any other share. Pricing process is 
therefore based on valuation methods. But all evaluation methods are based on 
forecasting and forecast is based on personal convictions that can differ a lot 
between investors, as they may have different expectations of future earnings, 
future discount rates, future systematic and idiosyncratic risks, about present 
conditions, about markets, about managers, about competitors etc. 
As there is an ample of uncertainty regarding the IPO firms, valuation of its 
shares is not so easy. So, underwriter - the investment banker who helps the IPO 
firm to price, market and sell the issue - often works with other investors, trying to 
elicit their preferential information that can help in pricing the IPO shares. That's 
why the pricing decision is not a simple mechanical algorithm, while there are 
many factors, personal interests, market feedback and investors sentiment that 
have to be put together to establish the offer price. The investment banker has 
skills and experience in observing these factors and will, depending on his own 
opinion about them, set the fair offer price. 
Fair offer price cannot be viewed alone. Instead the allocation process has 
to be observed in the same time. It is due to the fact that offer price was 
established conditional on investors' feedback and since they helped the 
investment banker to set the price more fairly, they have to be rewarded by 
receiving the underpriced shares. And the level of underpricing is determined by 
the costs that investors incurred in evaluating the company. 
Therefore, as the IPO share price is not a simple algorithm, there are some 
incentive constraints that the investment banker has to follow in establishing the 
price and allocation rules. Since the IPO process is not exact, there is a huge 
possibility that the future researchers will find and identify something new that has 
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an impact on IPO process and that actual IPO process (which differs a lot from 
country to country) will be out of date in the future. 
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  Appendix 
Abstract ─ English version 
  As many things in economics, the IPO problematic is also not exact, and 
there is an ample of literature and different opinions about influences, relations 
between the parties involved, conditions, timing, expectations and others related to 
the IPO process. 
   One of the most interesting and enigmatic features of the IPO process is 
how the price of new-issued shares is determined. The IPO shares should be 
priced and valuated as any other shares, but there are some interesting features 
that IPO shares demonstrate and explanations of these features, as for example 
IPO underpricing, Hot-issue market or Long-term underperformance of IPO 
shares, are miscellaneous. 
  Pricing process is not a simple mathematical algorithm. Nevertheless, 
different valuation methods are used in the pricing process, but the difficulty of 
estimating the future revenues, choosing the appropriate discount rate, valuing the 
assets in place, estimating the growth probabilities, and lack of comparable firms 
in most of the cases makes the IPO pricing process more complex. Due to this 
complexity, the pricing and distribution process is commonly conducted by an 
investment banker, a specialized institution that has more experience in pricing 
and distributing activities, and which is employed by the issuing firm to help in the 
IPO process. This investment banker is called the underwriter of the issue. 
  As the value of a company is not  determined only by idiosyncratic factors, 
but with the external ones like market conditions, political risks, competitors, 
expectations and plenty of others as well, the company has to learn these factors 
and somehow incorporate all of them in the share pricing process. 
  The intuition is that the issuing company and its underwriter do have some 
knowledge about these outside factors, but they are in disadvantage comparing 
with the aggregate knowledge of all the other market participants.  This point of 
IPO process is the most interesting one – Issuing firm, willing to price its share 
precisely, has to cooperate with the outside investors, who will on the other hand 
benefit if the price is not set at an appropriate level. 
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  The main problem an issuer faces is how to induce these informed 
investors to reveal their preferential information knowing that they might benefit 
when reporting falsely. It is the bookbuilding process that enables the information 
extraction and rewarding the truth-telling investors. The process of building a book 
is nothing else but the collecting of indications of interest from potential investors, 
and setting the price and allocation.  
  The main characteristic of the bookbuilding process is that there is no rule 
about setting the price and determining the allocation that each investor will 
receive. This is the big advantage of the process because the investment banker 
can punish the falsely-reporting investors by excluding them from allocation, 
induce the potential investors to scrutinize the firm and set the price at the level 
which will enable the investors to recoup their research costs. 
  Possibility of being excluded from the allocation if reporting falsely induces 
the informed investors to reveal their preferential information. In return, the 
investment banker promises these investors to receive more shares as a reward 
for telling the truth. These shares have to be underpriced as well, but not so much 
as they would have been without information collecting process. The informed 
investor hence faces the trade-off between falsely reporting and hoping to receive 
allocation in more underpriced shares and reporting truly and receiving the bigger 
allocation of less underpriced shares. Therefore, the conditions that an investment 
banker has to observe is that informed investors have to be better-off when 
reporting truly than when reporting falsely, and that the issuing company itself has 
to benefit from the information gathering process as well. It is possible that both 
benefit, while this interaction between them reduces the free riding of uninformed 
investors which will get less amount of highly priced shares. 
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  Abstract ─ German version 
Da es keine allgemein gültige Formel oder mathematischen Algorithmus für 
einen Börsengang (engl. – IPO, Initial Public Offering) gibt, bietet die Literatur eine 
Fülle an Informationen über Einflüsse, Beziehungen zwischen den eingebundenen 
Parteien, Rahmenbedingungen, Zeitpunktwahl und Erwartungen beim Börsegang. 
Eine der interessantesten und rätselhaften Eigenschaften des IPO-
Prozesses ist die Preisbestimmung von neuen Aktien. IPO-Aktien sollten wie 
Aktien, die bereits gehandelt werden, bewertet werden. IPO-Aktien weisen aber 
einige interessante Eigenschaften, dessen Erklärungsversuche unterschiedlich 
begründet sind, auf. Einige dieser Eigenschaften sind zum Beispiel die IPO-
Unterbewertung, Hot-Issue Markt, und schwache langfristige Leistung. 
Obwohl sich der Bewertungsprozess von IPO-Aktien als komplexer 
mathematischer Algorithmus gestaltet, werden dennoch verschiedene 
Bewertungsmethoden verwendet. Diese Methoden haben einige Schwächen, wie 
z.B. die Unsicherheit künftiger  Einnahmen und Erträge, Wahl eines adäquaten 
Abzinsungsfaktors, Bewertung der vorhandenen Assets, Wachstumsraten, 
unzureichender Peer-Group Vergleich bei einer zu kleinen Unternehmensgruppe 
usw. 
Wegen dieser Komplexität bei der Bewertung von IPO-Aktien, wird der 
Preiskalkulations- und Vertriebsprozess durch eine Investmentbank durchgeführt. 
Diese haben sowohl in der Preiskalkulation als auch in der Distribution mehr 
Erfahrung. Aufgrund ihrer einschlägigen Bewertungs- und Vertriebserfahrung 
werden sie von der emittierenden Gesellschaft in den IPO Prozess eingebunden. 
Investmentbanken sind auch unter dem Schlagwort Konsortialbanken bekannt.  
Der Wert einer Gesellschaft ist nicht nur durch idiosynkratische Faktoren 
bestimmt, sondern auch durch äußerliche (systematische) Faktoren 
(Marktbedingungen, politische Gefahren, Mitbewerber, Erwartungen, usw.) Im 
Rahmen des Börseganges müssen alle diese Faktoren erwogen und in die 
Berechnung des Emissionspreises einfließen.  
  Emissionsgesellschaft kann mithilfe der Investmentbank einen Teil der 
Außenfaktoren bewerten, jedoch ist sie im Vergleich zu der Information der 
anderen Marktteilnehmer immer noch im Nachteil. Dieser Punkt des IPO-
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Prozesses ist der interessanteste - die Unternehmer die ihre Anteile genau 
bewerten möchten, müssen mit den Außenkapitalanlegern zusammenarbeiten, die 
andererseits wieder einen Vorteil haben, wenn der Preis nicht am passenden 
Niveau gesetzt wird. 
     Demzufolge besteht für den Emittenten das Hauptproblem darin einen 
Zustand zu generieren wo informierte Kapitalanleger wissen, dass sie einen 
Vorteil haben könnten, wenn ihre Information unentdeckt bleibt. Mit dem 
Bookbuilding-Prozess ist es dem Emittenten möglich informierte Kapitalanleger 
zum Aufdecken ihrer wahren Präferenz zu bewegen.  
  Der Bookbuilding-Prozess ermöglicht die Informationssammlung und die 
Belohnung der beteiligten und „Wahrheit-Sagenden“ Investoren. Er unterteilt sich 
in die Sammlung von Interessenindikationen der potenziellen Kapitalanleger und 
deren Einstellung bezüglich des Preises und der Allokation. 
  Es liegen keine standardisierten Regeln über die Erstellung des Preises 
und den Ablauf der Zuteilung der Aktien an die potentiellen Kapitalanleger vor. Ein 
großer Vorteil des Prozesses liegt darin, dass die Investmentbank falsch-
berichtenden Kapitalanleger vom Zuteilungsprozess bestrafen und somit 
ausschließen kann. Weiters haben die potenziellen Kapitalanleger das Recht das 
betreffende Unternehmen zu prüfen und den Preis so anzusetzen, dass die 
Möglichkeit der Deckung der Forschungskosten besteht. 
Die Gefahr bei einer falschen Berichtigung vom Zuteilungsprozess 
ausgeschlossen zu werden, veranlasst die Investoren zur Offenlegung ihrer 
Informationen. Als Gegenleistung für diese Offenlegung garantiert die 
Investmentbank den Kapitalanlegern einen höheren Anteil. Diese Anteile werden 
mit einem Abschlag ausgegeben, der jedoch niedriger als bei einem Fehlen eines 
solchen Informationssammlungsprozess ist. Der informierte Kapitalanaleger steht 
folglich vor der Entscheidung einerseits durch falsches Berichten mehr 
unterbewertete Anteile erhalten zu können oder andererseits durch richtiges 
Berichten sicherlich eine höhere Anzahl von weniger unterbewerteten Anteilen zu 
bekommen. 
Unter den gegebenen Bedingungen beobachten die Investmentbanken, 
dass ein wahrheitsgetreues Berichten mehr Vorteile für den informierten 
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Kapitalanleger bietet als ein falsches Berichten. Zusätzlich muss die 
Emissionsgesellschaft selbst aus dem Prozess der Informationssammlung einen 
Nutzen ziehen. Es ist möglich, dass beide von so einem Austausch profitieren. 
Des Weiteren wird die Gefahr des „Free-riding“ von uninformierten Kapitalanlegern 
reduziert, da diese eine geringe Anzahl an höher bewerteten Anteilen bekommen. 
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